A critical explorative investigation into the operation of memory in human expression and artificial intelligence : a Joussean perspective. by Moodley, Nareen.
A critical explorative Investigation into the 
Operation of Memory in Human Expression and 
Artificial Intelligence: 
A Joussean perspective. 
Nareen Moodley 
Submitted in partial fulfillment for the Master's Degree in 
Orality-Literacy Studies, 
University of Natal, Durban. 
December 2000 
ABSTRACT 
There is a supposition that with the current progress in artificial intelligence (AI), 
machines that surpass the cognitive functioning of human beings is imminent. There is no 
doubt that singular human functions can be performed more efficiently by machines. 
however. the complexity of human functioning involves the simultaneous cognizance of 
information received through the various senses. The complexity of human functioning is 
best reflected in the perceptions of Marcel Jousse in The Anthropology of Geste and 
Rhythm (I997). 
Vlhilst proponents of AI envisage the cognit ive functioning of the computer 
surpassing human cognitive functioning, they fail to acknowledge that human cognitive 
functioning extends beyond mere information processing and expression of predictable 
responses. The complexity of human expression is influenced by a variety of sensory 
environmental stimuli as well as previous experience. 
The fundamental ' law' of the indivisibility of the psycho-physiological complexus of 
the human composite identified by Jousse, indicates that human memory emanates from 
human interaction with the environment. The computer is incapable of interacting with 
the environment in the way that the human being interacts, which implies that it cannot 
replicate human memory. 
This study argues that: 
• The human being operates simultaneously as a psychological, physiological 
and biological being, which implies that human memory, is simultaneously 
biological, psychological and emotional. 
• Human memory arises out of mimism and is biologically rhythmed. and that 
this rhythm operates in synchrony with the universal cosmoiogicai rhythms. 
• Computer rhythms do not operate in synchrony with universal cosmologicai 
rhythms. which implies that the operation of its memory is very different to 
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The term' Anthropos' signifies holistic man. lousse (1997) talks 
about the Anthropos as "an interactionally miming animal" (ibid: 
128), i.e., he re-plays the actions, sounds and movements of the 
world around him. He also sees him as one who "has the ability to 
develop abstractions" (ibid: 547). 
The ' geste' according to lousse (1997) is much more profound and 
primary than language and gesture. The geste is action, but it is 
action that allows us access to reality. a reality that exists within 
ourselves, for that is the only reality we know. The actions are 
"received through our multiple reception apparati. Whether 
macroscopic or microscopic, whether we are conscious of it or not, 
that received reality is the human geste" (ibid: 658). 
Macroscopic (geste) The ' macroscopic ' gestes are gestes that are externally ex-
pressed, that are visible to those around. Examples of macroscopic 
gestes would be ritual and facial expressions. 
Microscopic (geste) The 'microscopic' gestes are those that are minute and are not 
externally visible to anyone, but are nevertheless constantly 
occurring. They include the pulses of the body, and our thoughts. 
vi 
Tri-phasism "Triphasism is fundamentally the unconscious play of cosmological 
interaction. This cosmological interaction becomes anthropological 
from the moment it reverberates in the Anthropos" (Jousse 1997: lIS). 
Jousse views all interactions as taking place in clusters of three, i.e., 
An Acting One acting on the Acted upon. The Acting One and the 
Acted upon are clusters of energy that propel a characteristic action. 
Therefore. in the universe, there are actions acting on other actions 
constantly. which generate interaction. u[F]rom this infmite Acting 
One an indefinite number of transitory Actions will be able to spring 
forth" (Jousse 1997: 116). 
Anthropocybersynchronicity This is a term that has been coined by Joel Orr. 
··[A]n*thro*po*cy*ber* syn*chro*ni +*ci*ty n [fr Gk anthropos, man 
+ cyber, governor + synchronicity, coming together in time]. The 
study of the rhythmic aspects of the person - computer interface" (Orr 
n.d.). What· underscores his discussion is that productivity in any 
human! computer interaction would be increased if the computer and 
human being were in rhythmic harmony. 
Re-gister Jousse uses the word 'register' as in 'carrying recorded things again' 
or 'carrying recorded things once more'. The etymo logy of the term is 
derived from Latin: re - 'once more, again, afresh' + gerere, gestus, 





'gestes' by re-ordering them. This process is continuous and constant 
and involves symmetrical oscillation, for man is a bilateralised being. 
Jousse uses this term to describe the human being's acquisition of 
knowledge. which is obtained through man's instinctive tendency to 
"mime all the actions of the living beings and all the traits of the non-
human objects that surround him" (lousse 1997: 63). The human 
being's interaction with the environment has changed in the current 
social milieu, for man has adopted a more "bookish' learning rather 
than his instinctive tendency. which is mimism. 
The human being's interaction with the universe IS essentially 
rhythmic and arises out of mimisrn. "Rhythrnism comes into action 
simultaneously with Mimism" (lousse 1997: 122). Rhythrnism is 
ordered and logical because it arises out of a pattern. In tri-phasic 
interaction there is the pattern of the Acting One acting on the Acted 
upon, which is fluid and continuous. Rhythmism is logical because it 
is constantly being ordered through the process of're-gistering' . 
The human being is a double-sided being and he operates as such in 
his interaction with the universe. When he interacts, whatever is 
outside of him becomes a part of him through mimism, and whatever 





balance, which implies that all the human being's interactions are 
balanced. In all man's movement (Le., walking, running, rocking) 
there is bilateral balancing. This bilateral balancing influences the 
rhythmic nature of man's interactions. 
Fonnulism is " ... the stereotyped propositional geste" (Jousse 1997: 
665). The 'propositional geste' refers to gestes that have not been 
broken up into parts, but they contain a unit of meaning. When these 
'propositional gestes' recur, they give rise to fonnulas. "One of the 
most powerful notions associated with formulas is the notion of 
returning events. If something has happened in a particular way once, 
it will happen again in the same way at a la(er time" (ibid.). Formulas 
are recurring patterns, which implies that they are rhythmjc. 
The term 'intussuscept ' derives from 'suscipere', which is the grasping 
of the external world, and 'intus', which is the internalising thereof 
(Jousse 1997: 661). The human being takes all (he actions from his 
interactions and synchronises them in order to ex-press them. In 
synchronising the gestes within him, he makes them a part of him. 
The 'mimeme' is the reanimation of the characteristic action of the 
mimed object, which reanimation occurs within the human being. "It is 
ix 




INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
Before the next century is over, human beings will no longer be the most intelligent 01" capable 
type of entity on the planet Actually, let me take that back. The truth of that last statement 
depends on how we define human. And here we see one profound difference between these two 
centuries: The primary political and philosophical issue of the next century will be the definition 
of who we are (Kurzweil 1999:2). 
The 20th century has been a century of progress and development in science and 
technology that has culminated in statem~nts such as Kurzweil's, which questions how 
we define 'who we are', The question arises, because there has been a dark side to 
technological development, which has been the disruption and destruction of nature, and 
nature forms an integral part of humanness . 
To be human' implies a living, breathing being that possesses a dynarrtic memory that 
IS spontaneous and serendipitous. It implies having intelligence, emotions2 and 
consciousness, which lead to creativity. Jousse (1997) says that we are afraid of ' life' and 
therefore in trying to understand the living, breathing Anthropos, we study bones, 
skeletons and artefacts rather than living, breathing beings. 
It is only through the study of living, breathing beings that one can attempt to 
understand the human being's capacity for memory, intelligence and consciousness. For 
it is memory that establishes personal identity. 
Memory for our own personal history is of great importance since it is an essential element of 
personal identity. To a considerable extent we are what we remember ( ... ) [But], Memory for 
personal experiences has other functions besides that of reinforcing personal identity. It provides 
us with a store of 'recipes' for handling current problems and current situations" (Cohen 1989: 
109). 
The human memory consists of "patterns of connections in nerve cells" (Cowley & 
Underwood, et aJ 1998). The generation of ' patterns of connections' is stimulated by 
interaction with the environment. It is the human being's capacity for identifying 
'patterns of connections' as well as creating novel connection patterns that demonstrate 
his intelligence. Therefore memorisation3, in the fonn of rote learning, should not be 
mistaken for intelljgence. An illustration of the difference between intelligence and rote 
learning would be how a set of instructions is used to construct a geometric object. The 
ability to assimilate the instructions and apply the knowledge, motor and visual skills to 
construct the object is a sign of intelligence, as opposed to simple regurgitation of the 
instructions without being able to construct the object. 
It is the lack of understanding of inteUigence, consciousness and the operation of 
creative memory that has allowed the proponents of artific ial intelligence the freedom to 
view the computer as a means for the human being to achieve immortality. Is it not ironic 
that man seeks to use a non-living creation to achieve etemallife? 
The dictionary definition of ' human' makes it clear that to be 'human' is to be viewed 
or held apart from machines. The human being is able to show emotions and feelings, he4 
is able to reflect on events and experiences and apply the acquired knowledge to current 
and future experiences. Therefore, the popular belief that the computer will at some point 
possess a general level of intelligence comparable to that of man and will eventually 
supersede man because it will be able to operate cognitively like a human being poses a 
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problem. Man does not function only as a cognitive being. There is also an emotional 
aspect to man's behaviour that cannot be dismissed, for the emotions influence cognit ion. 
This study is an explorative investigaliol\ concerning the quest to create a machine 
that is able to function intelligently like a buman being (tbe Anthropos). Tbe issue of 
creating a machine of this nature JX>ses a great challenge to the scientists in the field of 
artificial intelligence and is fraught with many dilemmas. Nevertheless, the quest 
continues and I am fully aware that. as J write this, many new developments are taking 
place in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). 
The thought that scientists actually believe that the computer can be a superior 
'being' to Man and will therefore supersede man in the evolutionary process raises 
concerns and questions numerous moral and ethical values. Moravec ( 1988: 1), one of the 
supporters of the evolution viewpo int says, 
Today, our machines are still simple creations, requiring the parental care and hovering attent ion 
of any newbom, hardly worthy of th e word 'in telligent' . But within the next century they will 
mature into entities as complex as ourselves, and eventually into something transcending 
everything we know--in whom we can take pride when they refer to themselves as our 
descendants. 
The prediction that machines will ' transcend everything we know' is yet to be 
realised even though the end of the centtu)' has come and gone. But there have been 
further developments in the field and there are many scientists nurturing their creations. 
One such creation is 'Cog', a robot developed at the Massachusetts Institute of 
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Technology (MJT) under the direction of Professors Lyon Andrea Stein and Rodney 
Brooks. 
It is being designed to pass through an extended period of artificial infancy, during which it will 
have to learn from experience, experience it will gain in the rough-and-twnble environment of the 
real world. Like a hwnan infant, however, it will need a great deal of protection at the outset, in 
spite of the fact that it wi ll be equipped w ith many of the most crucial safety-systems of a living 
being (Dennen 1994). 
Cog is being likened to a human infant, which will grow into a human-like adult, 
which brings us once again to the definition of ' hum.n ' . Jousse (1997: 56-57), when he 
talks about the human being states: 
Viewed from lhe outside, man is a complexus of gesles. To all the movements executed by the 
human composite, I will give the name gestes. Visible or invisible, macroscopic or microscopic, 
developed or only hinted at, conscious or unconscious, voluntary or involuntary, these gestes, 
nonetheless, manifest the same essentially motor nature ( ... ) Only man has gestes which are 
played and re-played. Gestua l play and re-play of an sorts are mostly unconscious; but, for al l that. 
they develop tirelessly and interchangeably. 
This implies that the human being is constantly involved in movement. From the 
' microscopic' physical and psychological pulses within his body (which are invisible to 
others) to the movement of his arms and legs as forms of expression, man is continually 
involved in movement. All meaningful movement is 'geste', which can be understood as 
action. Jousse coined the term 'geste' for the very specific type of action that he is 
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referring to, which is what is "received by the anthropos" (lousse 1997: 658), and 
becomes a part of him. The gestes can be microscopic or macroscopic, voluntary or 
involuntary. An accumulation of gestes within the human being constitute his memory. 
Man is continually re-ordering, re-patterning and re-playing these gestesl actions in order 
to express himself. It is this ability to re-order. re-pattern and re-play these gestesl actions 
in creative and original formulas that is exclusive to man. 
This study will relate these perceptions of Jousse to the notion of developing a 
machine that will possess a general level of intelligence comparable to man by 
identifying and discussing some of the major theories on artificial intelligence proposed 
by the various schools of thought (Dreyfus. Weizenbaurn, Dennen, Moravec, Kurzweil, 
Franklin, etc.), which will be explained in the literature review. 
My hypothesis is based on the perceptions of Marcel Jousse In his theory of The 
Anthropology of Geste and Rhythm (1997), which elaborate certain behaviours that are 
exclusive to man. I will evaJuate the similarities and differences between computers and 
humans, with particular reference to how the memory operates in human beings, 
according to !ousse's understanding of: 
• The indivisibility of the psycho-physiological complexus of Anthropological 
geste; 
• The Psycho-physiological laws of human expression; 
• Tri-phasic interaction; 
• The Universe plays in and the Anthropos re-plays; 
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And Orr' s of: 
• Anthropocybersynchronicity: Rhythm In human and computer memory and 
expression. 
r have opted to use Jousse ' s theory predominantly because he identifies the 
indivisible psycho-physiology of the anthropos which implies that all experience is 
psycho-physiologica~ i.e., in the whole being, therefore simultaneously biological, 
psychological, emotional and spiritual. This in turn implies the biological nature of 
memory and intelligence. Theories of human memory other than that of Jousse have been 
excluded from the parameters of this study and will therefore not be discussed. 
Jousse (1990: xix) says that Man's "obsession with tools to apprehend and grasp 
reality pre-occupied man, from the making of all his muscles into tools, to the creation of 
those admirable machines which astonish us today." Man developed these tools to assist 
in his interaction with the environment. At first , the human being fashioned his own body 
into a tool to carry out tasks that were necessary for his day to day functioning. This soon 
developed into the use of external devices or tools. These tools were simple and hewn of 
stone, then bronze, and used to perfonn very basic functions with increasingly greater 
ease. Later he developed more complex tools to carry out more complex tasks. 
The computer is just one of the tools that was developed to assist man in canying out 
mundane and repetitive tasks as it does not share the same physiological make-up as man. 
Bush (1945:3) confirms this when he says, 
But creative thought and essentially repetitive thought arc very different things. For the latter there 
arc, and may be, powerful mechanical aids. 
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Adding a column of figures is a repetitive thought process, and it was lon g ago properly 
relegated 10 the machine. 
The idea of using computers merely for performing mundane tasks were thoughts of 
an earlier era (pre-1950). Since Turing's 1950 article in the British philosophical journal 
Mind, where he proposed what was subsequently known as the "Turing Test" (Gray 
1999), many new developments have taken place in computer operations. Therefore, the 
computer is now being viewed in a very different light. 
The Turing Test or "imitation game" was developed to test the intelligence of the 
machine. It pitted two subjects~ one a human being and the second an inanimate machine 
against a third subject, a human being. The third subject would question the two subjects 
and receive responses from them, through a typed medium. The third subject would have 
to identify which of the respondents was the machine and which the human being. The 
result would depend on whether the machine was able to convince the third subject that it 
was human. At this time, no machine has been able to 'pass' the Turing Test. 
In the same 1950 article Turing "proposed the idea that a machine could leam from 
and thus modify its own instructions" (Gray 1999). This idea was the forerunner to what 
is now called "Artificial Intelligence" or "AI". Scientists such as Franklin (1995), 
Moravec (1988), Levy (1992) and Kurzweil (1999) working in the field of AI are 
prop:mnding a theory of evolution for the further development of artificial intelligence. 
They do not see it just as the evolution of AI, but rather as part of the development of the 
Human Species. 
The line of distinction between humans and computers is fading rapidly with the 
innovations in the field of Al, and very soon we will question the role that the computer 
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will play in our lives. For as McCarthy (1983) points out, we already ascribe 
anthropomorphic terminology to the machines that we use by saying things like the 
machine 'thinks' or 'knows', etc. While the computer may be programmed to perform 
many 'human' tasks in the real world that may indicate that it 'thinks' or 'knows" it is 
not able to originate thoughts. Another question that is raised is whether it should be 
allowed to perform these 'human' tasks as it does not interact with the real world in the 
same way that a human being does. 
The point is that there are some human functions for which computers ought not to be substituted. 
It has nothing to do with what computers can or cannot be made to do (Weizenbaum 1987: 270). 
The two issues raised here regarding computers are ftrst, the moral issue and second, 
the functional issue. The moral issue regarding computers will not be discussed explicit ly 
for it underpins the argument presented. What this study will focus on are the functional 
capabilities of the computer and whether these capabilities can be compared to those of a 
human being. 
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2.1. Aim of Studv 
CHAPTER 2 
SETTING THE PARAMETERS 
The aim of this study is to use the theories of Marcel lousse to investigate the 
functioning of memory - defined as 'the act of remembering' or 'the faculty by which 
things are recalled to or kept in the mind' (The Concise Oxford Dictionary) - in human 
beings (the Anthropos) and artificial intelligence ('the application of computers to areas 
normally regarded as requiring human intelligence' (The Concise Oxford Dictionary)). 
This study will investigate the Anthropology of Geste aDd Rhythm for Jousse's 
perception of how memory functions in humans, and will tben relate these 
perceptions to the operation of memory in AI. 
There is a certain perception (e.g. AI , science fiction, etc.) that implies that 
'thinking machines' (higher order computers) are developing a capacity to operate 
independently of human beings and will eventually develop sufficient capacity to operate 
as intelligently as human beings, thereby replacing them The rationale is that some 
theorists view the development of the computer as part of the evolutionary process. This 
study will examine this perception critically, and demonstrate that: 
• Jousse's perception of the human being as an indivisible psycho-physiological 
complexus implies that man operates simultaneously as a biological, 
psychological and emotional being. 
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• The process of 'receive, re-gister and re-play' as expostulated by Marcel Jousse in 
his theory of the Anthropology of Geste and Rhythm operates differently in man 
and computer. 
• Jousse's perception of the mnemoruc laws, which are fundamental to human 
memory and expression, operate differently in man and computer. 
• Interaction with the universe - tx>th internal and external - as manifest in Jousse's 
understanding of 'im-pression' and 'ex-pression' operate differently in man and 
computer. 
In order for the computer to do what the human being does, it must operate in the 
same way that the human being does. 
2.2. Scope of the Study 
This study involves a qualitative interdisciplinary analysis, interpretation and 
evaluation of relevant texts. Consequently. certain aspects need to be considered to 
substantiate material selection. 
Firstly. because this is an interdisciplinary study there are volumes of information 
available in the form of articles, books, papers, etc. that cover the field of AI, as well as 
the many other areas of study that feed into it, namely, philosophy, psychology, 
languages, sociology and science. The literature is diverse, therefore, I have had to 
restrict my study to theorists whose work related most specifically to the focus of this 
study, which relates to memory in human expression and AI. 
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Secondly. there are a number of issues that are pertinent to the AI debate (e.g. , 
language acquisition, speech recognition, etc.). Discussions of these issues are minimal, 
for these concerns are not the focus of this study. However, where it has been necessary 
to elaborate on these issues to support the central argument, more detailed discussions are 
presented. 
Thirdly, this study provides a synthesis of information, which poses certain problems. 
Some explanations for certain concepts like memory, intelligence, etc., may be 
considered inadequate. What has been compiled is supporting data for an argwnent that 
gravitates around a Joussean viewpoint that is persuasive and consistent. I have 
deliberately excluded a discussion on spirituality from this study, as it wouJd broaden the 
parameters substantially. For the sake of brevity. comprehensive arguments for every 
aspect have been deliberately omitted without compromising the study. 
2.3. Literature Review 
Many theorists have made contributions to discussions on memory and human 
expression as well as to the development of AI. In this section I will briefly discuss some 
of the perspectives of some of these theorists who I have considered important for this 
study. Because of the expansive nature of this study, there has been a need to place 
certain restrictions on it. I have therefore decided to focus on theorists whose 
contributions have covered as broad a spectrum of my study as possible, as well as 
theorists who have embraced interdisciplinarity. 
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The theorists whose works have been consulted for this study come from the fields of 
psychology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, linguistics, computer science, 
neuroscience as well as the biological sciences, 
The focus of this study is ]ousse's perceptions of memory in human expression and 
how this relates to artificial intelligence. I will not discuss ]ousse's work here, as there 
will be a discussion of his theories that underpin this study in the section 'Theoretical 
Framework'. 
The theorists whose work will be looked at here are Dreyfus, Weizenbaum, Franklin, 
Kurzweil, Dennett, Turkle, Moravec, McCarthy. and Bronowski. There are a number of 
competing paradigms in the A1 debate. Although not distinct, three 'schools' emerge 
from the literature regarding AI, which I have grouped according to their views on Al. 
The selection was based on how the views of the theorists relate to the focus of this study. 
They are: 
I. The A1 Protagonists 
2. The A1 Antagonists 
3. The A1 Agonists 
What follows is a brief discussion of the views of select~d theorists who represent the 
different schools ofthought. 
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2.3.1. The AI Protagonists 
This ' school' believes that in the not too distant future we will have 
superinteUigent machines whose capacity for functioning intelligently will supersede 
human functioning. This belief stems from pioneering work by Newell and Simon 
and is upheld by Moravec (1988), Kurzweil (1999) and Dennett (1994). 
In 1956 Simon and Newell's success in "programming a computer using 
Symbolic representations to solve simple puzzles and prove theorems in the 
propositional calculus" (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1988: 19),. led them to believe that they 
could achieve greater heights in the furure. They believed that this success would lead 
to further developments in computing until in the near future, a computer would be 
able to handle a range of problems that would be comparable to the human being's 
capacity for problem-solving. That eventually thought and learning would not be 
exclusive behaviours to human beings, but that a computer could be programmed to 
exhibit these behaviours as well. Moravec (1988), Kurzweil (1999) and Dennett 
(1994), who are followers of this tradition, lent support to this idea by claiming that 
these superintelligent machines, that were still to be developed, would be our 
descendants. 
Moravec's (1988: 115) vision is that we would one day be able to make copies of 
ourselves that would inhabit different bodies and that it would be possible to merge 
memories from these copies into a single one. The "memories of events would 
indicate in which body they happened," which he compares to human memories 
which are defined by a context. He also talks about a human being carrying "a kind of 
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portable computer" (Morayec 1988: II D), whicb would be programmed with the 
human being's genetic makeup. This computer wou1d be able to monitor and mimic 
every action that the human being executes and would eventually be able to provide a 
"convincing imitation of you. When you die, this program is installed in a mechanical 
body" (Morayec 1988: 110-111) that would take oyer the life and responsibilities of 
tbe buman being. 
In a similar vein, Kurzweil (1999: 53) proposes a supposition of scanning a 
human being 's "entire brain and neural system C ... ) and replacing it with electronic 
circuits of far greater capacity, speed, and reliability ." .He does acknowledge that at 
present tbese are frightening thoughts but he feels that buman beings will ultimately 
recognise the benefits of such a system. He feels that all that is needed to so lve 
intelligent problems are simple methods and ample quantities of computation. He also 
predicts that by the year 2029 computers would far exceed the functioning capacity of 
the human brain. 
Dennen (1994) is one of the members of a tearn who have developed Cog, a 
humanoid robot. He presents Cog as being an infant even though it is the size of an 
adult and alleges that Cog will pass through an "extended period of artificial infancy." 
During this period of its 'life' it is expected that it would ~Iearn' from experiences in 
its interaction with the environment. He also states that one of the talents they would 
like to teach Cog is an aptitude for human languages so that it would be able to 
behave like a human being. 
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2.3.2. The Al Antagonists 
The second 'school' include those theorists who express negativity regarding the 
possibility of creating a machine that will be able to replicate human intelligence. 
This negativity ranges from moral and ethical concerns to the impracticality of 
replicating the mental function of the human being. which is not fully understood. ]n 
this 'school' I have included Dreyfus, Weizenbaum and Bronowski. 
In 1972, Dreyfus predicted that the proposed development of a machine that could 
replicate human functioning was doomed to failure. The reason for his argument lay 
in his belief that conceptions of mental functioning at the time were naIve, as well as 
his view that digital computers are limited not SO much by being mindless, as by 
having no body. While his view was widely attacked at the time. his work has 
subsequently been studied and is often quoted. When he first wrote What Computers 
Can', Do (1972) he provided a controversial position in a current debate. However, in 
the later edition of his book Whal Compulers SlilI Can 'I Do (1993: ix) be reinforces 
his argument that "After fifty years of effort, ( ... ) it is now clear to all but a few 
diehards that this attempt to produce general intelligence has failed." He also clarifies 
his position that even though it has failed, it does not mean that artificial intelligence 
can never succeed, because there is no proof of that. However, be does think that it is 
highly unlikely that it will succeed. 
Weizenbaum's (1987) contention is that the disparity between the human being's 
capacity for understanding and the computer's capacity for understanding is 
unbridgeable. His point of view is that for understaoding to be shared, both parties 
require a similar internal knowledge base that is similarly structured and that is 
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similarly defined for a particular domain of knowledge. Understanding is therefore 
domain-dependent. 
Weizenbaum contends that lhe limited successes of AI research using restricted domains are 
misleading, because as the domain of discourse grows, the difficulty of the problem and the 
size of the computer programs needed to deal with the problem growex.ponentially. Thus, he 
argues, machine intelligence that duplicates hwnan intelligence is impossible (Albus 1981 : 
297). 
Bronowski's (1965) discussion centres on the human being and how he interacts 
both with his environment and other human beings. He ob::;t::rves the human being's 
capacity for the development of language, literature and drama and infers that these 
areas of interaction are unique to man. He perceives that no animal or machine would 
be able to replicate this behaviour of the human being because of their inability to 
interact the way the human being does through these various modes of expression. 
2.3.3. The AI Agonists 
The third 'school ' includes McCarthy, Franklin and Turkle, who have all evoked 
interesting discussions on AI and raised many relevant questions that are important 
considerations for the further development of AI, but who have not explicitly 
assumed a position in the AI debate. 
This school raises questions that relate to issues about the place of the human 
being and the computer in the order of things, for even though we may be able to 
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create machines with "mental qualities more like our own, we'll probably never want 
to deal with machines that are too much like us" (McCarthy 1983: 9). What we need 
to think about is designing programs that facilitate the human-machine interface. 
Other questions pertain to 'what is tbe mindS?, and 'what are the differences 
between the mind and the brainT (Franklin 1995). Franklin's bias is towards a 
paradigm of mind that questions the purpose of the mind and he presents an 
argument. which culminates in him naming this paradigm the "action selection 
paradigm". The "action se lection paradigm" is based on his view that cognition is 
'1.he process by which an autonomous agent se lects actions, including those processes 
which by objectificatioo; categorisation. and so on create the agent's own world from 
its environment" (Franklin 1995: 420). 
Turkle (cited in Brody 1996) on the other hand looks at the effects of cyberspace 
on real life as well as the question of identity when interacting in cyberspace. But this 
is not her only contribution, for she has highlighted the reason for a noticeable lack of 
psychological approaches to memory in the infancy of the AI debate. 
During the early 1950 's, American Academic psychology was dominated by 
behaviourism. The essence of the period can be summed up in stimulus-response 
theory and any discussions of memory were seen as a violation of scientific thinking. 
It was only with the further developments and new thinking about the computer in the 
1950's and later, that people were beginning to see the mind in a different light. "The 
computer presence relegitimated the study of memory and inner states within 
scientific psychology" (Turkle 1988: 242). It is for tbis reason that a substantial 
portion of the AI debate stems from philosophical considerations. 
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This literature review highlights a few of the current debates in AI. There are a 
number of other theorists and other lX'ints of view to be expressed, however, many of the 
arguments are embedded within the study and have therefore not been discussed here. 
Theories of memory and human expression as relates to Jousse have not been presented 
in this literature review as these themes form the crux of the argument presented in this 
study. Instead, this literature review establishes a foundation on which to base the 
argument that follows. 
2.4. Theoretical Framework 
This study is based on the theory of Marcel Jousse, a French linguist, anthropologist, 
psychologist, educationist and theologian. What follows is a brief discussion of what 
prompted ]ousse to develop a theory of memory and human expression in the Anthropos, 
which theory underpins this study. The basis of his research was the anthropos with 
particular reference to the areas of memory and human expression. This study will look at 
how his observations of memory and human expression relate to the debate on Al. 
Jousse's aim was to establish universal, anthropological laws that would apply 
through all eras and all cultures. The laws are derived from a fundamental law, which is 
the indivisibility of the psycho-physiological complexus of the human composite, which 
is pervasive and durable in time and space. While the laws remain constant, the 
application of these laws of expression vary from one ethnic milieu to the next and that is 
what accounts for the uniqueness of each individual. This uniqueness of each individual 
directed him to explore how the individual interacts and expresses individuality within an 
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ethnic milieu. The laws that have been identified by Jousse (1997) and that form the basis 





As stated above, these four laws are rooted in the indivisibility of the psycho-
physiological complexus of the human composite, which will also be discussed in detail 
in order to provide a foundation for the four laws. 
A brief comment on Jousse's use of the word 'law' is appropriate at this stage. The 
time of Jousse's writing was a time of scientists, a time when they presented their 
perspectives as laws. Current thinking excludes the notion of absolutes, so the tenn 
'laws' is inappropriate. The more appropriate tenn to use today would be 'operating 
principle' . They are ideas that can be advanced and contested. The use of the word 'law' 
s ituates Jousse in a particular time and I will therefore continue using it in the foUowing 
discussion orms work. 
The second theorist who has provided insights to this study is Joel Orr who coined the 
term 'Anthropocybersynchronicity'. He coined the tenn ''to describe an area of person! 
machine interface" (Orr n.d.), which he felt was largely unexplored. The focus of his 
study was rhythm in machines and the importance of rhythm in operating the computer. 
This formed a link with Jousse's law of rhythmism, which is a fundamental 
anthropological law. 
19 
What has been presented here is a brief discussion of the views of the two theorists 
who form the basis of this study of memory in human expression and Al. The theories 
presented provide a foundation for the detailed study that follows. 
2.5. Methodological Considerations 
The nature of this study has generated certain difficulties that need to be considered 
for the methodological structure. One of the considerations is ]ousse's termino logy, 
which was coined by him in the interests of semantic precision, and therefore requires 
some explanation. Explanations of some of the terms as they relate to this study are to be 
found in the glossary, and where necessary they are embedded in the text. 
There are a number of common tenus that have been hyphenated by Jousse. This has 
been done to emphasise the etymology for greater precision in the usage. 
Another consideration is the difficulty in compartmentalising the information into 
sub-headings in order to create a readable structure. The Anthropos is a composite, and 
ex-presses itself as such. It is impossible to divide it into parts and still expect it to 
function as a complete being. In the same way there were problems in trying to physically 
divide arguments about memory, thinking, intelligence and consciousness, as well as the 
role that the brain and the body play in all of this. I found that some of my arguments 
were being repeated and some of my supporting quotations covered all these areas as one. 
There may be a number of points that are cross-referenced, however, I can only hope that 
the argument is clear and succinct in its logic and that the reader will accommodate this 
complexity and its associations, as only a human can! 
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CHAPTER 3 
CREATING THE CONTEXT 
This chapter outlines some important issues concerning this study. It looks at the 
human being's dependence on computers, some of the questions that have been raised in 
AI, as well as some of the problems experienced. It creates the context for the argument 
that fo Uows. 
Man has created a dependence on computers without even realising he has done so. 
Had computers been removed from society a few years ago ,we would still have been able 
to function normally; however, because we have now incorporated computers into every 
facet of our lives, it would require a certain measure of adjustment and at times would 
appear to be quite impossible to continue without them. 
We appear to have come to a time in which the ideas that there are differences between human 
beings and machines. that there are experiences that human beings can have but machines cannot, 
and that therefore (at least!) there are thoughts humans but not machines can have, we have come 
to a time in which the holding of such ideas is a lonely preoccupation, a business that tempts one 
to doubt of one' s own sanity (Weizenbaum 1987: xiii - xiv). 
As the importance of computers continues to grow and innovations in the field 
emerge at a fast and furious pace, computers are becoming increasingly entrenched in the 
general activities of our lives. It is this reliance on computers that has suppressed the 
voices against the development of AI, which are growing fainter. This comes down to the 
fact that very little distinction is being made between the computer as a tool to assist 
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man, and the computer as a form of AI, which has the capacity or potential to substitute 
man. While scientists have developed machines that can replicate the mechanical 
behaviour of human beings, either independently or as an extension of the human body. 
up until now they have not been able to create a machine that is able to think Ilke a 
human being or exhibit human intelligence in its fullest sense. An attempt to create a 
human-like machine is the creation of the Virbot, which is a 'virtual mannequin' that 
seems to be almost semi-human (Setton 2000). Although it is virtual, which implies it 
does not operate in real time and space, its interaction is almost hurnan~ like in terms of its 
gestures6, speech, etc. 
Therefore the moral and ethical issues that are certainly considerations for further 
developments in AI, and that are quite often not thought about are certainly taking on a 
more serious dimension. 
One position I mean to argue appears deceptively obvious: it is simply that there are important 
differences between men and machines as thinkers. I would argue that, however intelligent 
machines may be made to be, there are some acts of thought that oughJ to be anempted only by 
humans. One socially significant question I thus intend to raise is over the proper place of 
computers in the social order ... (Weizenbawn 1987: 13). 
This again raises concerns about the moral issues involved in developing artificial 
intelligence. While this study does not focus on the moral issues explicitly, they do form 
part of the context of the argument to follow. Winman (2000), in his discussion of 
"thinking software" asks a fundamental question that certainly is an important moral 
consideration for artificial intelligence. '"What then will we do about "thinking software"? 
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What rights will it have? ( ... ) if you unplug your well-behaved thinking computer, have 
you violated its fundamental rights?" These questions would also pertain to the Virbots, 
especially because they appear almost human-like in their functioning. What rights would 
they have? 
Another consideration is that of accountability. Who will be held accountable if the 
computer suddenly lost control and went crazy? Would it be the programmerls or the 
computer itself? The notion of accountability is not exclusive to Al, for there is a similar 
debate regarding the social and moral responsibilities of scientists generally. While these 
are important considerations that need to be seriously considered for the future of AI, this 
study will not focus explicitly on the moral and ethical issues any further. Instead. the 
moral and ethical considerations underpin the discussion of the functional capabilities of 
the computer as compared with the intellectual capacities of the human being. 
Developers of AI foresee the computer as a replacement for the human being, 
especially when they talk about "scanning the brain to downJoad it". The expectation is 
that they would "capture every little detai]" from this type of scan and that "the new 
person will claim to be that same old person and will have a memory of having been that 
person . .. " (Kurzweil 1999: 124-125). However, memory and thought are not localised in 
just one part of the human being. lousse (1997) argues that there is much more to human 
memory and human thought than can be accounted for by the activity and capacity of the 
brain. 
Primacy of thought and memory has been erroneously accorded to the brain. Professor Janet, my 
master, was jusrified in emphasising the exaggerated role attributed to the brain . Historically. the 
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brain was regarded as the sole source of thought and memory. I have dethroned th e brain and 
accorded it its rightful place: it is a 'commutator' which switches us into consciousness. 
Our thought. which is the bringing into consciousness. will thus no longer pulse to the rhythm 
of the brain, and our memory. which is the re-play of consciousness, will thus no longer respond 
to the rhythm of the brain. It is to the rhythm of the body as a whole that thought and memory will 
pulse and respond. Rhythm is collectively and continuously imbricated: the rhythm of our hearts, 
the rhythm of our breathing, the rhythm of the balancing of our hands. of our footsteps, of our 
act ions, depending on which part of our bodies we use to ex-press the intussuscepted, intelligised 
and globally re-played Cosmos (Jousse 1997: 195). 
In the above discussion Jousse looks at the ro le of the brain in memory and human 
expression. The studies that have been carried out into the functioning of the human brain 
indicate that developers of AI (e.g. , Albus) would like to replicate the functioning of the 
brain in order to replicate human thinking and memory. This kind of thinking is doomed 
from the start . 
Firstly, as Aleksander & Bumett (1983: 60) point out, "The construction of robot 
brains poses a problem ( . .. ) they have no blueprint of the model they seek to imitate, the 
human brain.. .... They extend their argument further when they point out the 
philosophical limitat ions to the brain undertaking an introspective study of how it works. 
This would not really be an appropriate approach for the possibility will always exist that 
the conclusions will be coloured by some inherent bias, which implies that the results of 
this introspective study would be inaccurate and incomplete because the thought 
processes are constantly changing. 
Secondly. it is impossible to deduce from the study ofa dead brain, bow a living brain 
functions. All that can be studied in a dead brain is its structure and component parts: the 
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functioning, the processes, and the products of the processes, which are the most 
pertinent to AI, cannot be understood by a study ofa dead brain. 
And thirdly. it is due to the fact that "the brain is quite simply a conglomerate of 
switches ( ... ) it is not the brain that detennines psychological activity; it only regulates 
it" (Janet cited in JOllSse 1997: 70). For as JOllSse (1997: 195) says. "It is to the rhythm of 
the body as a whole that thought and memory will pulse and respond." Therefore a study 
of the brain will not provide a key to unlock the door to understanding how memory and 
thought operate in the human being. 
Jousse ~ s perceptions of the operation of thought and memory in man are multi-
layered. In order to understand these perceptions and compare them to AI. I will discuss 
thought, memory, intelligence and consciousness under the following headings: 
I. The Psycho-physiological Complexus of Man - which will look at how man 
interacts with his environment and the implications that this interaction has 
for Al. 
2. The Psycho-physiological Laws of Human Expression - the four laws of 
Mimism. Rhythmism, Bilateralism and Fonnulism. and the role they play in 
memory and thOUght in the human being as well as the computer. 
3. Re-ceive, Re-gister. Re-play - bow the pr~cess of 're-gistering' informs 
man's ability to re-play what he has re-ceived and whether the computer has 
the capacity for re-gistering in order to, and before re-play. 
4. lm-pression and Ex-pression - that man will ex-press what has been im-
pressed, though not necessarily as it was im-pressed due to the process of re-
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gistering. And whether this ex-pression functions m the same way m the 
computer as it does in man. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY OF HUMAN INTERACTION 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of man's interaction with the universe, 
which involves both brain and body. It is interaction with the universe that leads to 
knowledge acquisition. Initially the discussion centres on The Psycho-Physiological 
Complexus of Man, it continues with a discussion of Tri-pbasic Interaction, for all 
buman interaction is tri-phasic. 
4.1. The Psvcho-Phvsiological Complexus of Man 
The psycho-physiological complexus of man is an important consideration in the 
development of AI because there is a need to study man as a composite i.e., a 
combination of mind and body. This view is supported by Wittgenstein' s 
understanding of the psychological aspects of the human being i.e. , thinking, 
intelligence, memory, etc. that are based on two proposals. The ftrst is that "the very 
features of our minds are in some essential way tied to the specific organisation of our 
physical organisation, our body" (Neumaier 1987: 151). Secondly, "If we want to 
know whether a certain being can 'think ', we do not only investigate its ability to 
perform specific tasks but, rather, the total of its behaviour" (ibid: 152). 
Many mechanisms have been developed to replicate the functioning of human 
limbs. some of which have been a great success (e.g. , mechanical arms used in 
industry, as well as robots that are able to pick up and move blocks about a room). 
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These have been successful particularly because their function has been limited to 
mechanical movement without any thought involved. The great challenge now for the 
developers of AI is to develop a mechanism that has the ability to function 
cognitively and emotionally like a human being. It is for trus reason that the brain has 
now become the focus of study. There are, however, some fundamental problems 
with this focus. 
Firstly, "there is never a body without a brain in nature" (poUack cited in 
McFarling 2000). Which implies that to study the brain in isolation would pose some 
very serious problems. (c[ Pg. 24). 
Secondly, while robot bodies have been created that can replicate human 
movement, there are some very basic human characteristics that they lack which may 
not necessarily be localized in the brain. Janet (cited in Jousse 1997: 70) expresses a 
similar view to that ofWittgenstein when be says: 
In reality. man thinks with his whole body; he thinks with his hands. his feet, hi s ears. as well 
as with his brain. It is absolutely ridiculous to claim that his thought depends on a part of 
himself: it is tantamount to saying that our manual ability depends on OUT fingernails . 
Iousse supports Janet's doctrine that "man thinks with rus whole body". Tills 
doctrine arises from the argument that <to think' is to do and man is constantly in the 
process of doing which means that he is constantly involved in action. "Action does 
not depend on the brain; it is not performed by it ( ... ) A brain separated from a living 
being is incapable of thought or of action" (Janet cited in Iousse 1997:70). The 
reasoning Jousse uses is that the muscles form part of the circuitry that is involved in 
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action, so if the brain were detached from the muscles it would be incapable of action. 
We may be able to copy all the neural connections in the human brain, but that would 
not produce the psychological activity that is very much a part of the Anthropos' 
interaction with the environment. In additio"" muscles without a brain would also be 
incapable of actio"" which confirms the complex nature of man. He further states that, 
"Psychological activity is an activity of the whole - it is not a localized activity" 
(Jousse 1997: 70). 
Albus (1981: 298) on the other hand feels that "There is no reason to suppose that 
the present human brain represents any theoretical maximum of intellect." In fact, he 
feels that to educate the human mind in logic and reason requires enormous effort, 
which implies that "other methods for computing and remembering could be much 
superior." While he recognises that there is more to the human mind and memory 
than the brain, be does not acknowledge the role of the body in constructing memory. 
He believes that it is possible to construct a robot brain that would be able to store all 
the information in all the libraries of the world and that if one adds another 
hierarchical level, it would be possible to "make robots more intelligent than humans" 
(Albus 1981: 298). 
What he disregards at this point is the fact that there is an enormous difference 
between the capacity to store information and the capacity to manipulate stored 
information in order to function intelligently. One definition of intelligence is the 
ability to organise components of information to solve problems with the highest 
degree of efficiency (Klix 1987). Therefore to function intelligently the human being 
is able to re-organise and manipulate the components of information with the highest 
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degree of efficiency to meet the needs ofa given situation by using stored information 
and past experience as reference points. Albus (1981: 298) does admit, "Nevertheless, 
because of their very different physical forms and prior learning experiences, robots 
and humans will forever remain very different creatures." 
Jousse, however, is quite clear in his assertion that the psycho-physiology of man 
IS indivisible and it is the same indivisible human composite that underpins 
psychological activity. This implies that man functions simultaneously as a 
psychological, physiological and biological being. The brain merely operates like a 
switchboard (cf. Pg. 23-25) that diverts the various pulses that are received by it. This 
view is supported by the research of two Americans, McCulloch and Pitts, who in 
1943 demonstrated that the neurons (nerve cells) which form the basic components of 
the brain functioned similarly to "the valve circuits which provided the switches in 
machines like ENIAC [Electronic Numeral Integrator and Calculator]" (Aleksander 
& Burnetl 1983: 79). The ENIAC could be considered the ancestor of the computer, 
notwithstanding that it operated on a decimal system. 
The computer, just like the brain contains a conglomerate of switches that work 
on a binary system ofO's and I's (unlike the ENIAC), that control aU the processes in 
the computer. The switches that make up the human brain, however, do Dot entirely 
account for the various psychological activities that the human being can accomplish. 
In other words human intellectual capacity stretches beyond the capacity of the brain. 
This view is supported by Pert (1997) who says that research carried out by Dr 
Eric Kandell and his associates have proved that "biochemical change wrought at the 
receptor level is the molecular basis of memory." What happens is that when a 
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receptor is flooded with ions or molecules, the ceIJ membrane changes so that the 
probability ofan 
electrical impulse travell ing across the membrane where the receptor resides is facilitated or 
inhibited ( ... ) These recent discoveries are important for appreciating how memories are 
stored not only in the brain, but in a psychosomatic network extending into the body. 
particularly in the ubiquitous receptors between nerves and bundles of cell bodies called 
ganglia, which are distributed not just in and near the spinal cord. but all the way out along 
pathways to internal organs and the very surface of our skin (Pert 1997: 143). 
The decision about whether a thought bel:omes COnsCIOUS or remams in the 
subconscious is mediated by the receptors. It is because of this that she feels that 
'"memory processes are emotion-driven and unconscious" (ibid.), though they can 
become conscious because they are receptor-mediated. Because of the relationship 
between memory and the emotions, memory as well as performance are affected by 
the mood the human being is in. Strong emotions amplify our experiences and fLX our 
memones. 
The body is therefore an important factor in human thought and memory, which 
implies that it cannot be disregarded in the development of artificial intelligence. This 
is substantiated by Dreyfus (1972: 147) when he points out some of the shortcomings 
in artificial intelligence related specifically to the notion of the brain being the centre 
of intelligence. 
In thinking that the body can be dispensed with, these thinkers again follow the tradition, 
which from Plato to Descartes has thought of the body as getting in the way of intell igence 
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and reason, rather than being in any way indispensable for it. If the body turns out to be 
indispensable for intelligent behaviour, then we shall have to ask whether the body can be 
simulated on a heuristically programmed digital computer.lfnol, then the project of artificial 
intelligence is doomed from the start (Dreyfus 1972: 147). 
Dreyfus raises an important question here when he mentions the indispensability 
of the body for intelligent behaviour. If the body is dispensable then why do the 
computers that are presently in operation not demonstrate a capacity for intelligence 
and reasoning that is comparable to the human being's capacity for intelligence and 
reasoning? In their attempts to develop an intelligent ·machine. Minsky and Papert 
developed a computational model that looks at the mind as "a society of interacting 
agents. These agents are anthropomorphized, ( ... ) but they do not have the 
complexity of people" (Turkle 1988: 259). Each agent is "dumb", but when they 
interact, the conflict that emerges from their opposing views generates complex 
behaviour like thought or emotion. In order for the system of interacting agents to 
function coherently, an intelligent system must be able to repress certain conflicts 
while allowing others to be expressed. [n order for intelligence to emerge, the system 
would need censors to identify which conflicts to repress and which to express 
(Turkle 1988). The censors are inherent in the human being, but in the computer 
would have to be programmed. 
Each agent in this model is dependent on other agents and unlike a human being 
would not be able to function on its own. Therefore if the machine had to exhibit 
intelligence, it would be intelligence built into it by the programmer based on a 
particular context, but it would not have the capacity to allow it to adapt to other 
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contexts. The human being's capacity for intelligence stem from his ability to re-
organise and manipulate the information received from the environment efficiently 
and to identifY what to repress and what to express. The adaptability of the human 
being is an important consideration for his development, for progress is a function of 
adaptation. 
While the computer is able to simulate the performance of tasks that are 
performed by human beings like processing, storing and retrieving information; the 
execution of these tasks is very different to that in the human being. The computer is 
able to identify different aspects of a situation because it has been programmed to do 
so, but it is not able to "originally [emphasis added] establish the tenns of a 
distinction" (Sokolowski 1988: 60). A simple example to illustrate this point is the 
computer's inability to recognise the indent required for the beginning of a paragraph 
in the main text when the paragraph starts after a 'stand alone' quotation. It is not able 
to identifY the one as a quotation, or as a group of words that do not fonn part of the 
paragraph in the main text, though they differ in size. This substantiates the point that 
the computer is not capable of processing information in the way that a human being 
does. 
What it is able to do is to manipulate formal symbols. The fact that the human 
being, who is the programmer of the computer as well as the interpreter of the output 
generated by the computer, extrapolates the symbols to his reality is beyond the scope 
of the computer (Searle 1987). The computer has the ability to operate on the symbols 
but has no understanding of the symbols. One of the reasons for the difference In 
human and computer processes may lie in Dreyfus's explanation that: 
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A brain in a bott le or a digital computer might still not be able to respond to new sorts of 
situations because our ability to be in a situation might depend, not just on the flexibility of 
our nervous system, but rather on our ability to engage in practical activity. After some 
attempts to program such a machine, it might become apparent that what distinguishes 
persons from machines, no matter how cleverly constructed, is not a detached, universal, 
immaterial soul but an in volved, self-moving, material body. 
Indeed, it is just the bodily side of intelligent behaviour, which has caused the most trouble 
for artificial intelligence (Dreyfus 1972: 148). 
Our ability to 'engage in practical activity' involves an entire body that is able to 
extrapolate not just thoughts and ideas from one situation to the next, but also actions, 
which form an integral part of the human being's interaction with the environment. 
The above arguments sustain lousse's perception that the human being is an 
indivisible psycho-physiological being. However. Jousse (1997: 70) funher states that 
"man is a complexus of gestes" and that "the universe presents itself as a fonnidable 
interlacing of unconscious, predetermined interactional gestes which he can and will 
re-play consciously and voluntarily." The human being interacts with the 
environment through the geste. The geste can be both microscopic e.g., in dreams as 
well as reflection or meditation, as it plays and re-plays itself within the human being 
through the vibrational energy received from the environment; and macroscopic e.g., 
when one sleep walks or in a ritual act, as it presents itself in the fonn of action that is 
visible to others. This ability to play and re-play gestes is unique to the human being. 
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The human being's interaction with the universe unfolds from the very tips of his 
fingers to the innennost workings of his body. It is for this reason that Turner and 
Poppel view 
Human infonnation processing ... [as being] hierarchical in its organisation. In the columns of 
neurons in the sensory cortex a plausible reconstruction of the world is created by a hierarchy 
of cel ls, the ooes at the base responding to very simple stimuli and passing on their findings [0 
cells programmed to respond to successively more complex stimuli . Likewise, motor 
decisions are passed do\Wl a long command-chain of simpler and simpler neural 
servomechanisms (Turner & Poppet n.d.). 
The idea 0 f the hierarchy that exists in human information processing links up 
with Pert 's discussion of the psychosomatic network (c.f. Pg. 31), for the operation of 
the various cells in the network become increasingly complex as they form a link with 
the central nervous system. 
Iousse (1997: 57) sees the human being as the "emitter of physiological gestes, 
and psychologically capable of intellectualizing and of 'propositioning' these gestes 
in order to express the most spiritual of his mental attitudes." The human being's 
basic form of expression is and always has been the geste, which stems from 
intussusception. Intussusception is "the grasping of the external world and the 
internalising thereof i.e. the synchronising of all the gestes that flow from nature into 
man, so that he can ex-press them" (Iousse 1997: 661). Each human being 
intussuscepts differently for each human being is different. The manner in which the 
inrussusceptjon is played and re-played within the human being is '~personal and 
particular". Because we are not aU equal, the preservation of the re-play depends on 
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the depth of the intussusception and the capacity of the human being (Jousse 1997: 
123). The internalising and conscious re-play of the geste arises out of the human 
being's interaction with his environment. 
As Turner and Poppel (n.d.) state, 'human information processing' which is the 
internalising of the geste, occurs in a hierarchical fashion. It originates at the 
extremities via sensory experiences, and through continuous play and re-play it is 
intellectualised and intussuscepted. There are a variety ofsensory experiences that are 
unique for each individual. Once the sensory experiences have been intussuscepted 
they can be re-ordered, re-patterned and categorized by, the individual in order to ex-
press himself in creative and imaginative ways. The categories constructed by the 
human being as well as the re-ordering and re-patteming are not fixed , but constantly 
change to accommodate new experiences. 
One of the stumbling blocks in artificial intelligence has been the inability of the 
computer to interact with the environment in a way that is comparable to the 
interaction of the human being with the environment. For as Bronowski ( 1965) says, 
while we may not understand how memory and the brain functio~ we would be quite 
mistaken to assume that the human being's picture of the world is a "passive record", 
For the picture is made up of all the human being's activity from the inner operations 
of logic and emotion to the external actions of expression which include his use of 
tools. The picture of the world "is not the look of the world but Our way of looking at 
it: not how the world strikes us but how we construct it"(Bronowski 1965: 34), and 
this construction would include not just the external stimuli. but our internal 
associations as well. 
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Dreyfus. who presented arguments against artificial intelligence since the 1960's, 
was initially dismissed. However, in recent years his arguments have been considered 
in a more serious Jjght. His argument stemmed from his belief that Man's relevance 
was holistic and that we have ""common sense background Wlderstanding that allows 
us to experience what is currently relevant as we deal with things and people [which] 
is a kind of know-how" (Dreyfus 1993: xi). 
By "know-how' he is not referring to procedural rules, but rather knowing how to 
deal with exceptions, and this would arise out of man's interaction with the 
environment and his intussusception thereof. The human being is often not aware of 
the extent of 'know-how' or common sense understanding he possesses. Minsky 
(1982) points out that some of the earliest AI programs "excelled at 'advanced' 
subjects, yet had no common sense." He attributes the success of these "expert" 
progranunes to the fact that experts can sometimes "get by with deep but narrow 
bodies of knowledge - but common sense is, technically, a lot more complicated" 
(ibid.). When a computer is presented with a problem, it needs an algorithm (set of 
rules) to solve the problem as well as instructions to perfonn all the other processes 
involved in solving the problem, which in a human being is common sense 
understanding (Aleksander & Burnen 1983). The computer does not have this 
common sense understanding because it does not share the same kind of interaction 
with the environment that the human being does. The problem that arises would be to 
program this 'know-how' into the computer, because 'know-how' does not 
necessarily operate logically. 
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lousse (1997) argues that this ' know-how' which derives from memory. IS 
embedded within us through memorisation. Memorisation is the 
unconscious interactional montage which we bring wholly into our consciousness before 
releasing it in the gestual and rhythmic mechani sms ( .. . ) lntelligence is then enabled to be 
infinitely more supple, more enthusiastic, more combative. more victorious ( ... ) The truest 
manifestation of ' man ' is he who has the greatest number of habits, intelligently accumulated 
in him (ibid: 141). 
He can allow these ' habits' to lapse into his unCOnsciOUS in order to free his 
intelligence to focus on current situations. An example of thjs would be explained by 
the human being's capacity to drive a car. Once the gestes of driving a car have been 
'brought wholly into consciousness ' through intussusception, the driver does not have 
to think about how to change the gears, or how to turn the steering wheel because 
these gestes are a part of him. These ' habits ' would have lapsed into his unconscious, 
which would aUow him to focus on what is happening on the road ahead. 
The human being uses his whole body to memorise. The interaction of the human 
composite with the environment and the intussusception of this interaction gives rise 
to memory, which implies that memory is dependent on man 's experiences. 
Bronowski (1965) regards experience as a critical factor in knowledge acquisition. 
In order to see iF there is a selF in man which is not mechanical, we have to look not inside 
the brain, but into hi s acts of experience. We have to analyse the nature of different 
experiences, and how they are turned into knowledge. This is critical, because once the 
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knowledge is decisively fix.ed for action. the biological machine must take over (Bronowski 
1965: 21-22). 
Bronowski is quite certain that the body is important for the acquisition of 
knowledge, which occurs through experience. The process of 're-gistering' (which 
will be discussed in chapter 6) is responsible for transforming these experiences into 
knowledge which forms memory. 'Re-gister' refers to man's ability to re-order and 
re-pattern intussuscepted gestes in different ways, which accounts for creativity and 
imagination. Man then ex-presses what has been intussuscepted, through action. In 
Jousse's terms, all action is geste and all geste is action., but because his 
understanding of the term ' action ' is very specific, he coined the term -gestc'. 
In acknowledging the complexity of man., one can understand the problems 
experienced in developing a machine that will function as intelligently as a human 
being. Moravec ( 1988: 52), a staunch advocate of the theory of evolution (c.f. Pg 3), 
recognises the problems of creating a machine that will function intelligently like a 
human being. He asks, "How much further must this evolution proceed until our 
machines are powerful enough to approximate the human intellect?" and 
acknowledges that, "Too little is known about both the overall functioning of the 
human brain and how an intelligent computer would operate to make this estimate 
directly." What he fails to recognise is that the human intellect is not localised in tbe 
brain; that the brain is merely a control centre for the Anthropos in that it contains 
switches that direct and redirect pulses in order to send information to various 
destinations. For the brain is where all the connections are made. 
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Maddox's (1999) statement supports Moravec's view concerrung our lack of 
understanding of the human brain, and also identifies our Jack of understanding of the 
capacity for imaginatioI\ decision-making and consciousness. which are exclusively 
human, as being problem areas in AI. 
The catalogue of our ignorance must also include the understanding of the human brain. 
which is incomplete in one conspicuous way: nobody understands how decisions are made or 
how imagination is set free. W'hat consciousness consists of (or how it should be defined) is 
equally a puzzle (Maddox \999). 
The questions he raises are important considerations for AI. for the human being's 
capacity for creativity and imagination cannot be logically programmed into a 
computer. Neither can his capacity for consciousness. for the question of 
consciousness is st ill a burning issue in pbilosoprucal and scientific circles. 
]ousse's understanding of consciousness stems from intussusception, which is the 
internalising of the external world. This implies that consciousness originates from 
the interaction of the human composite with the environment. This brings one back to 
the point that the human being is an indivisible psycho-physiological complexus of 
gestes which reflects the indivisible complexus of the universe, indivisibly. 
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4.2. Tri-phasic Interaction 
Jousse (1997) says that tri-phasism i.e., An Acting One acting on an Acted upon 
"is fundamentally the unconscious play of cosmological interaction" (ibid: 115). It is 
"the fIrst and essential Law of Cosmologicai Energy, and it operates as such at all 
levels" (ibid: 117). He says, "the essential element of the Cosmos is an Action which 
Acts on another Action" (ibid: 116) and the cosmos is actually energy. The Acting 
One and the Acted upon are essentially each a cluster of energy, and it is the energy 
which then drives tbe action! geste. 
The human being "intussuscepts the cosmvlogical interactions and reverberates 
them in Anthropological interactions" (Jousse 1997: 120). The 'interactional geste' 
will be intussuscepted by the human being, using his sense of sight, and he will then 
revivify the action. The human being will choose a characteristic geste of the 
' Acting One ', which becomes the miming geste. The human being re-plays the 
miming geste of the 'Acting One', the miming geste of the action that is performed by 
the 'Acting One ' as well as the miming geste of the acted upon. ''This essential 
characteristic geste becomes, as it were, the Name of the being, regardless ofwbether 
the being is living or inanimate" (Jousse 1997: 121). This continuous re-playing of 
tri-phasic interaction in the human being, particularly the child, occurs spontaneously. 
[n this continuous re-play, the human being amasses a number of mimemes, which 
have been intussuscepted by him. The 'Mimeme' is the ''revivification of the 
characteristic or transitory geste of the mimed object within the Human Composite" 
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(Jousse 1997: 122-123), which is the reconstruction in our receiving mechanisms of 
the movements of entities around us. 
Rasmussen (1986: 100) proffers a similar explanation, which is "a large repertoire 
of different mental representations of the environment." He feels that the human 
being's ability to choose from this repertoire, rules to control behaviour, would 
provide an explanation for the human being's efficiency in dealing with complexity. 
Jousse's proposal of the 'mimeme' goes much deeper. for it is not merely a 'mental 
representation', but a psycho-physio logical geste that has been intussuscepted by the 
human being. And this implies that it constitutes and is constituted by the viscera of 
the human being. 
Jousse ( 1997: 124) says tbat the character of the human being stems from his 
ability to intelligise "the Interactions of what is real". The human being is no more 
than a receiver of interactions for everything starts with the interaction. The essence 
of the human being is his ' miming' cluster of energy. Sirnon (1966 cited in 
Rasmussen 1986: 74) states that the human being as a "behaving system" is really 
quite simple. The manifestation of complex behaviour over a period of time stems 
from "the complexity of the environment in which he finds himself{ ... ) his behaviour 
will reflect characteristics largely of the outer environment." The characteristics 
mentioned here are a reiteration of the 'characteristic gestes' that Jousse mentions. 
The human being's behaviour would therefore arise from the intussuscepted gestes of 
his interactions. 
"The Geste is the living energy which vitalises the global whole, the Anthropos 
( .. . ) The Geste is truly something which plays and re-plays . .. " (Jousse 1997: 119). 
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The human being's interaction with the universe is therefore tri-phasic, because of his 
gestual re-play, and repetitive in nature and can be either microscopic or macroscopic, 
for man 's interact ion with the environment is driven by energy which is the geste. 
The only way the human being will know something is when it is played or 
'gestualised' within him. 
Bronowski 's explanation supports Joussc's notion that "10 know an object in 
some depth, the ' human composite ' must first receive within itself, and thus become 
capable of re-p laying consciously and intelligently. a number of this object's 
transitory actions upon some other object" (Jousse 1997:69). Bronowski (1965: 90) 
says: 
The kinesthetic gestures stretch naturally inlo the form s of ritual. Before they go out to hunt 
dangerou s animals, many tribes have a ceremony of incantation , and it commonly includes 
some hunting actions. These actions have been described so often that we accept their 
presence as self-evident. Yet what can be their purpose? They are sa id 10 give the hunters 
courage. But it wou ld be truer to say that they give them the feel of the hunt: they make the 
Pygmy hunters at home wi th their pursu it, and take them into its coming turns and surp rises 
with the sense of action already in their muscles. 
It is man 's rhythmic, mimetic geste that is transformed into ritual; and in the re-
playing of the geste during the ceremonial, re-gistering takes place wh ich 
accomodales the action that will take place during the hunt for the human being 
would have intussuscepted the geste of the hunt. When the human being is faced with 
the an imal during the hunt it would provide him with the cue to remember the 
intussuscepted geste of the ritual so that he can carry out the required act ion. The 
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ritual that Bronowski discusses is a conscious perfoonance. Consciousness, he says is 
''''not merely an awareness of self' (Bronowski 1965:79), but it is also an awareness of 
our limitations within the environment and how we are able to operate within it. [t 
involves an understanding of nature as weU as an understanding of self. 
The computer does not have a conscious awareness of its actions or the 
environment within which it operates because it does not operate tri-phasically. The 
computer does not have the living energy which is the geste and is therefore not able 
to interact with the universe on the same level as the human being. Neither is it able 
to re-gister impressions. 
The Anthropos finds himself- the essence of his individual 'miming' cluster of energy - in 
me midst of the indefinite interactions of the Cosmos like a kind of living resonator, which 
resonator can only receive a limited number of vibrations (Jousse 1997: 124). 
The biological apparatus of the human being is fairly limited in its ability to 
receive the vibrations, for it does "not perceive vibrations below or above a certain 
frequency. Our apparatus is therefore selective" (ibid: 124). There are infmite 
vibrations that make up the Cosmos. The limited vibrations that the human being 
receives would be related to the intrinsic rhythms of the human being. Therefore the 
environment has a profound effect on everything that man does and the computer can 
never replicate this interaction, for the universe plays in and the anthropos re-plays. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL LAWS OF HUMAN EXPRESSION 
This chapter will look at the psycho-physiological laws or the mnemoruc laws of 
hwnan expression as identified by Jousse, and their function in providing an 
understanding of the operation of human memory. It will also critically analyse the 
capacity of computer memory in relation to these laws. 
Before discussing the psycho-physiological laws of human expressIon, there are 
certain methodological considerations that need to be explained. Jousse's concepts and 
perceptions are layered, complex and iterative and therefore form many different 
connections. The psycho-physiological laws of human expression that he has identified 
are no different in their complexity and their layeredness and therefore pose certain 
difficulties when discussing them on paper. The psycho-physiological laws are 
interrelated, for man interacts with the environment using the four laws sim ultaneously. 
The problem that arises, is the method to follow in discussing them for one cannot 
discuss all four laws simultaneously without confusing the reader. This section will 
therefore start with an exposition of each of the laws and their function in human 
expression as separate entities before bringing them all together in a discussion of how 
they operate simultaneously in man. The discussion will then continue with a focus on 
how the computer functions in relation to these four laws. 
The psycho-physiological laws of human expression are Mimism, Rhythmism, 
Bilateralism, and Formulism. 
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5.1. Mimism 
Jousse (1997: 668) identifies Mimism as "the instinctive tendency which the 
Anthropos alone possesses, to re-play all the gestes of the universe." The human 
being mimes what is around him involuntarily and through his own volition. 
Aristotle identifies mimism as a possible human-specific capacity, "For miming is 
congenital to the young Anthropos, who differs from other animals in that he is the 
greatest mimer and that he acquires his first knowledge through Mimism" (pOETICS 
IV 2 cited in Jousse 1997: 63). The human being acquires knowledge from miming 
what is in the environment whether it is in the form of nature, animals, or other 
human beings. In his miming of the interactional geste, the who le Universe 'is 
reflected', therefore "the whole Man ' reflects'" (Jousse 1997: 147). The actions, 
shapes or words that are mimed are Dot imposed on the human being. The computer 
on the other hand operates very differently because it is not able to interact with the 
environment in the way that the human being does. 
What was envisioned by the early pioneers of AI, especially Alan Turing, was 
that computers "might possibly go beyond arithmetic, and maybe imitate the 
processes that go on inside human brains" (Minsky 1982). In fact this ability to 
'imitate' has already been achieved by developers of artificial intelligence and is 
evident in a number of different programs, one of which is ELIZA, developed by 
Weizenbaum. 
ELIZA was a computer program that was developed to 'converse' in English. A 
human being would be required to type his message into the computer, the computer 
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under the control of the program would analyse the message and compose a response 
to the message in English. The program was constructed in a "two-tier arrangement, 
the Hrst tier consisting of the language analyser and the second ofa script. The script 
is a set of rules" (Weizenbaum 1987: 3). The two-tier arrangement derived from the 
need for conversations to be context-related. 
This program developed into what became known as DOCTOR, which was 
ELIZA playing a psychiatrist. Even though his program became quite popular, 
Weizenbaum had certain reservations regarding it . First, he was concerned about how 
emotionally involved people were becoming with the computer and how willing they 
were to anthropomorphize it, which highlights the moral and ethkal issues. Second, 
he was concerned that there was a widespread belief that the program "demonstrated 
a general solution to the problem of computer understanding of a natural language" 
(Weizenbaum 1987: 7). Weizenbaum is under no illusion about the functioning of the 
ELIZA program and is quick to point out that 
language is understood only in contextual frameworks. that even these can be shared by 
people to only a limited extent, and that consequently even people are not embodiments of 
any such general solution (ibid.). 
Even though the computer is able to give the appearance of functioning like a 
human being, it actually does not. Gleick (1983) mentions the ability that the 
computer has to 'imitate', but also points out its inability to perform simple functions 
that the human being is able to perform. 
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It 's no longer astounding to hear about computers imitating anything from a psychiatrist to a 
schizophrenic. Yet some of the abilities that add up to intelligence - abilities as simple as 
recogni sing the letter A, or predicting the next nwnber in a sequence (1-2-2-3-3-3-?), or doing 
Jumbles - have stayed as mysterious as ever (Gleick 1983). 
The computer's ability to 'imitate' as mentioned by Gleick, must be distinguished 
from the human being's capacity for mimism. The human being has the capacity for 
Mimism as well as imitation. The computer does Dot have the capacity for mimism as 
it does not interact with the environment in the same way as the human being. Jousse 
(1997: 646) makes a clear distinction between the two tenns for he says, ''Mimism is 
instinctive: imitation is voluntary" and that mirnism involves unconscious, 
involuntary action, whereas imitation is conscious and voluntary. The computer's 
ability to imitate a psychiatrist then would stem from the conscious and voluntary 
programming of the computer by a human being. The computer is dependent on the 
rules that are programmed into it by a human being and can only operate on those 
rules within a predefined logic. Therefore it does not have the capacity for recognition 
and neither does it have the capacity for prediction. 
The 'knowledge' or information that the computer receives IS imposed by the 
human being that operates it . The computer does not choose the information that it 
would like to acquire and in fact it is not able to acquire 'knowledge ' or information 
in quite the same way that the human being is able to. 
As Franklin (1995: 11-12) says, 
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AI systems tend to be designed and programmed, rather than trained or evolved. They tend to 
be propositional in nature, that is. based upon rules or some othe. data structure expressed in 
some language. 
The language that is used is not a natural language developed by the machine in 
the way that human beings developed their languages, but rather they are languages 
that have been specially designed by human beings for machines to be able to receive 
instructions. Natural languages evolved out of the human being's interaction with the 
environment within a social context through the human being's capacity for mimism. 
It is the capacity for interacting and re-organising infonnation within a social context 
that manifests in intelligence. The computer does not have this capacity, therefore the 
notion that Moravec (1988) and Dennett ( 1994) have of nurturing their mechanical 
creations from an artificial infancy until they develop a kind of ·adult ' intelligence 
will, in all probability, never be realised. 
The computer memory operates very differently from the memory of the human 
being, for the computer is not able to operate mimismologically but instead has its 
memory imposed on it, because the computer does not have the freedom of choice to 
experience its environment. in the fonn of 'mirnism'. 
5.2. Rhythmism 
Man's ability to intelligize what is real arises out of his rhythmic interaction with 
the environment. lousse (1997: 215) says, "We become conscious through meaning. 
Once the realisation of consciousness has been properly achieved. the living and 
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intelligent mechanism will play rhythmically." Jousse defmes rhythm as "the return 
ofan identical psycho-physiological phenomenon at biologicaHy equivalent intervals" 
(Iousse 1997: 678). What is implied here is that these rhythms operate on a 
psychological as well as physiological level. for man is an interactionalIy miming, 
rhythmic complexus. Rhythmism and mimism, according to Jousse, occur 
simu Itaneously. 
Mimism and Rhythmism. however, always come into play, constantly and intelligently. 
interdependently and simu ltaneously. Rhythmism is the life force which, of necessity, 
distributes and sequences mimism (Jousse 1997: 122). 
For it is the breath that gives us the rhythm. The concept of growing stems from 
the notion of breathing. Before the word 'existence' was coined, people used the 
word 'grows' or ' breathes' (Jaynes 1976). Growth referred not just to physical 
growth, but mental growth as well. Breathing occurs rhythmically and one of the 
signs of a malfunctioning human biological system is erratic breathing. It is because 
all rhythm is ordered and logical that it assists in sequencing mimism. 
The rhythm of human breathing is transmitted to the sensory-motor pathways in 
the brain which are all synchronised to the same rhythms. Therefore, there are 
"rhythmically recurring addresses input to the associative memory modules in the 
internal world model. These produce rhythmically recurring expectations to be 
compared with rhythmically recurring sensory experiences" (AI bus 1981: 200). 
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There are rhythmic patterns that permeate the entire processing-generating 
hierarchy of the human being, which underscores the reason for Jousse saying that we 
should not look to the arts for rhythm but rather 
to the unfolding of life. Human geste, propelled by an explosion of nervous energy. beats in 
biological meaSlUe ( ... ) Our bodies pulse successively and we are therefore rhythmed. Our 
bodies create the W1iversal and perpetual flow of Rhythmism (Jousse 1997: 269). 
For rhythm is intrinsic to the human being. Our hearts beat, our blood flows to a very 
specific rhythm. As Pert (1997: 242) says, "in the psychosomatic network, related 
events occur simultaneously in time and space, in spite of our perceptions of them as 
unconnected and independent." It is because the psychosomatic network operates 
within a specific order and logic that is related to its rhythm. Because of the rhythm, 
man is never motionless but has a continuous flow of thoughts, feelings, gestes. The 
rhythms also change depending on the stimuli from the environment. 
The computer is dependent on a human being switching it on to activate the 
electrical pulses that would give rise to its internal rhythms. While the computer is 
not able to breathe, it will not be able to grow and experience life, therefore it will not 
be able to learn, which implies it would lack the capacity for inteUigence, thinking, 
consciousness and memory. 
Orr (n.d.) claims that the secret to developing an effective computer system is 
Rhythm . Human-scale rhythms-visual, auditory, and kinesthetic--can and should be 
incorporated into the design of effective computer systems, ( ... ) [because] Both mechanical 
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and electrical engineers say a system is in resonance when it vibrates at its natural frequency. 
Energy from a resonating system moves easily to another system of the same natural 
frequency (Orr n.d.). 
Because the human being and the cosmos operate with a particular synchronicity, 
it implies the coincidence of their operation in time and space is more than chance: it 
stems from a cqsmologicaI order. This provides an interesting mechanical explanation 
for man's ability to interact with the universe, which was one of the areas of interest 
that Jousse studied -Human Mechanics. Jousse views Human Mechanics as devices 
for making a choice which "vibrates interactionally not fragmentarily C ... ) the 
vibrations which are outside us are never independent but always interacting. One 
vibration always acts on another vibration. In the Universe, everything interactivates 
everything" (Jousse 1997: 125). The Anthropos is able to conform to the rhythms of 
the universe at different levels because he is biologically rhythmed. 
The Anthropos operates on a circadian system. This basically means that there is 
an intrinsic rhythm, which correlates with the day night cycles of the universe as well 
as the longer cycles of the phases of the moon and seasons of the year. The circadian 
system is lodged in the Suprachiasmatic neuron in the frontal section of the skulL 
While the control centre for the circadian system is lodged in this area, it does not 
preclude the anthropos from synchronising with the circadian rhythm. The two main 
functions of the system are to synchronise the body with tbe environment, and to 
synchronise all the physiological processes in the body, it also synchronises the 
physiological processes with environmental changes. 
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As Colwell (n.d.) states, iftbe circadian rhythms are disrupted, the functioning of 
the human being is slowed down, and there is a possibility that the human being could 
become quite dysfunctional. An example of this is the mediocre performance of a 
person who is suffering from sleep deprivation. The person will be able to perform 
certain tasks, but the performance will be below their normal standard. 
The atoms in the brain as much as those in the body constitute a mechanism, which ticks with 
the same orderly regularity, and abides by sim ilar laws, as any other interlocking constellation 
of atoms. Men have uneasily pushed this thought out of their heads because they wanted to 
avoid the conflict with their rooted conviction that man is a free agent who follows on ly the 
promptings of his own will (Bronowski 1965: 8). 
But the human being's will is embedded within his environment, for he is able to 
appropriate what he chooses from what is ' Real '. [n Jousse's terms what has been 
intussuscepted through the geste is what is 'Real' (Jousse 1997: 186). 
The notion of rhythm has been tackled by a number of people (e.g., Orr, 
Bronowski, etc.) in many different field s. Tumer and Poppel (n.d.) also say that 
"brain processing is essentially rhythmic. n which cements Jousse's view of man being 
a bilateral rhythmic being, for it is not just the body that pulses with rhythm, but the 
brain as well. 
While the computer does operate within the rhythm of its electrical pulses, these 
are not the biological rhythms that Jousse ( 1997) discusses, and neither are they 
related to the rhythms of the universe. It is this lack of correlation with human 
rhythms that inspired Orr (n.d.) to discuss the negative interaction between man and 
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computer. His argument is based on 'anthropocybersynchronicity'. which is the 
synchronicity of rhythm between the anthropos and the computer, which he feels 
could enhance the human being's interaction with the computer. This would lead one 
to presume that if a robot were designed in ' the image of man'. it would still not be 
able to interact with the environment as successfuUy as the human being. for it would 
lack the intrinsic rhythm that forms an essential aspect of the human being's 
interaction within and with the environment, which originates in the vibrational 
energy of the breath. 
5.3. Bilateralism 
It is from the anthropology of mimism that the law of bilateralism of human 
expression derives for "The universe plays man, and man plays the universe" (Jousse 
1997: 669). Which implies that man's interaction with the universe has an impact on 
the environment and the environment has an impact on man. Whatever man receives 
from the environment is re-ordered and re-patterned, and when he re-plays (cf. 
Chapter 6) he can re-create the environment. M~ whether he likes it or not, 
is a double-sided being, and when he expresses himself globally, he balances his expression 
following the confonnity of his body. The law of Mimism can only be expressed in 
conformity with the human structure. Just as man walks in alternating balancings, so too he 
expresses himself in alternating balancings. 
If man expresses himself in balancings, it is because he has two symmetrical sides. This 
living law of the human organism is inescapable. 
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Why is there this kind of universality of balancings? Because these balancings facilitate 
gestual expression. They play in alternating pulsations of tension and relaxation. facil itating 
successive and rhythmic energetic explosions. 
( ... ) Mimism is, one could say, consubstantial with Bilatera lism. ' Man is an interaction ally 
and bi laterally miming animal' (Jousse 1997: 269). 
]ousse's interpretation of bilateralism is not restricted to the structure of the 
human being, but extends to every interaction in time and space. Because there is 
constant movement there is only the past and the future, nothing stands still long 
enough to belong to the present. The memory operates in a similar fashion. Cohen 
( 1989) identifies retrospective memory which " involves remembering events 
experienced in the past," and prospective memory which is "memory for a future 
act.'· Prospective memory is "remembering a plan of action", remembering to carry it 
out, as well as when to perform the act. She further states that "prospective memory is 
almost continuously active" (Co hen 1989: 24). As soon as the act has been 
perfonned, it becomes a part of retrospective memory. 
Bilateral balancing manifests in intelligent behaviour. Bruner ( 1974: 437) says, 
"the full evolution of intelligence comes as a result of bipedalism and tool using." 
Bruner's view is limited, but, it does support Jousse's view of bilateralism to an 
extent. Jousse's view of bilateralism and the manifestation of intelligence is more 
encompassing because Jousse does not see the human being as being intelligent 
because he has two feet . but rather, because he is a ' double-sided being'. So whether 
the human being is miming, running, walking, jumping or skipping, he is balanced 
because af ms bilateral structure. The balance of the interactions that the human being 
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is involved in can manifest either microscopically or macroscopically and this leads 
to order. The capacity of the human being to use tools stem from his intelligent 
interaction with the environment. The human being varies his behaviour in response 
to variations in his environment. These variations in his behaviour stern from his 
knowledge of a set of associations, which would be appropriate to the context of a 
given situation. 
Jousse (1997: 275) refers to intelligence as 
that aspect of life which brings itself into consciousness. lntelligence is gestual. lntelligence 
plays life bilaterally in a ll its modes, including the bilateral balancing between what is in front 
and what at the back. what is before and what after: the encapsulation simultaneously of the 
notions of time and priority. 
When Jousse (1997) addresses the issue of ' bringing into consciousness', he is 
referring to the human being's ability to consciously re-organise information in order 
to appropriate the information to accommodate the context. He calls this 
intussusception wltich is "the grasping of the external world and the internalising 
thereof' (ibid: 661). This "grasping oftbe external world" arises from the Anthropos' 
interactions with the environment through the various senses. The information that is 
received from the environment is re-played within the Anthropos and re-organised in 
many different ways as associations are made with information that is present within. 
In order to make these associations the meaning of the information has to be 
understood. Tltis understanding flows from the play and re-play that occurs wilrun the 
Anthropos. He says that •• ... man alone ' intelligizes' the interactions of what is real" 
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(ibid: 123). He inteUigizes what is real through the geste, for man is a 'complexus of 
gestes'. The geste refers to all movements that are executed by the Anthropos. 
The human being balances his gestes in accordance with the structure of the 
human body. The human being is bilaterally balanced, therefore man interacts 
bilateraUy in his gestual interactions with the envirorunenL In expressing himself as 
well, the human being operates bilaterally. For in order to express he has to repress. It 
is this ability to identify what to repress and what to express that demonstrates the 
human being's capacity for intelligence. 
Human ex-pression obeys an extraordinarily logical discipline. Confronted with the cosmos, it 
is the Anthropos' whole body which receives what is real, and which balances that received 
reality with its structural bilateralism (Jousse 1997: 268-269). 
Every interaction that the human being has with the environment is balanced 
according to his bilateral structure. When Jousse refers to the law of bilateralism, he 
is referring to any function of balance, which means that bilateralism is more than 
two-sided. The patterns of movement that the human being ex-presses occur in time 
and space. Everything in the cosmos operates in time and space, therefore there is 
order in the cosmos. Order arises out of balance. Everything in nature is ordered and 
therefore balanced. All activity has to be synchronised with the behaviour of the 
environment in order to serve its function. 
The computer to a certain extent operates bilaterally in accordance with the 
switches that operate it, which have to be either 0 or 1. However, the physical 
structure, unlike that of the human being, is not necessarily balanced. The computer 
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does not operate as a balanced bilateral being, for it is not a balanced bilateral being. 
Robots, however, that are being designed presumptively in the 'image of man'. are 
being designed as bilateral creatures. I use the word 'presumptively' because they are 
certainly not living, breathing beings that are able to interact dynamically with the 
environment in the same way that the human being does. 
5.4. Formulism 
The rhythmic geste that man plays, when "understood by another individual 
within the context of a social milieu" (Jousse 1997: 656), gives rise to formulas. One 
of the developments that has arisen out of the human being's use of formulas within 
an ethnic milieu is language. Formulas are therefore defmed by a context and involve 
interaction with other human beings. 
The formulas which are characteristic of the formulaic oral style are the inspired, definitive, 
linguistic accomplishment of hundreds and perhaps thousands of generations. Succeeding 
generations have worked dai ly to fashion 'verbal tools', that were, simultaneously, essential 
and obligatory, usable and practical, for the dual purposes of the social expression of their 
own personal knowledge C ... ) 
Each individual, man or woman, of this ethnic milieu, was trained daily by the community 
from early ch ildhood, to app ly himself( ... ) depending on the extent of his aptitude, he trained 
himself to create personal combinations of these ethnic formulas. Thus he improvised, always 
with rhythmic melody, new, individual compositions which differed in literary value from his 
neighbour's accomp lishments ( ... ) 'the unit of measure' in expression ( ... ) was the formula ... 
(Jousse 1997: 425). 
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In our use of language, context is everything. It is the context that determines the 
meaning of whole sentences, which assist in removing ambiguities that are inherent in 
the language. It is the context that restricts the range of possible meanings without 
one having to consider the range of context-free alternatives (Dreyfus 1987). 
The complexity of the human being's interaction with the environment lies in the 
fact that he constantly receives diverse stimuli from the environment. The stimuli that 
he receives are located within the environment as well as within other human beings 
and himself, which implies that they are context-based. All human interaction takes 
place within a particular context. The human being' s intellectual capacity is reflected 
in his abi lity to re-order and re-pattern these formulas to accommodate the changing 
contexts within the environment. 
The human being's ability to use language arises out of his ability to re-order and 
re-pattern fonnulas. His efficiency at manipulating these fonnulas culminates in him 
recognising the combinations of fonnulas as entities, not as sequences of letters or 
syllables (Aleksander & Burnett 1983). Human beings are guided by context in 
pattern recognition "in ways that cannot be duplicated by the computer using context-
free features and precise rules for relating them" (Dreyfus 1987: 44). Roboticists have 
had great difficulty in fmding algorithms to recog~se patterns in language, etc 
(Aleksander & Burnelt 1983), whereas human beings have the ability to recognise 
repeating patterns and to predict an outcome based on the repetition. Once the ability 
to recognise patterns has been learned, it becomes simple for the human being to 
recognise when deviations from the norm occur (Albus 1981 ). 
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The formation of patterns is fluid. It consists of formulas being taken apart and 
put together in new and creative ways. For Chalmers (cited in Franklin 1995: 34), the 
"beginnings of an answer to the problem of consciousness is his identification of 
pattern and information." The sequence of his argument is that, if pattern and 
information occur, then they always occur together. Patterns carry all information in 
the physical world. All patterns will carry some information, therefore, "patterns and 
information are two aspects of the same thing, PATrERN-INFORMATION." 
In order for the human being to become conscious of what he is, he must 
remember what he was as well as what he was not, for volition and decision are very 
much a part of consciousness. He must also remember what his environment was, for 
he interacts with the environment. He must be able to recall what is no longer visib le, 
for this is part 0 f the learning process, losing the 
limitation of the animal, 
OUl of sight, out of mind, 
and find[ing] the formula for human memory, 
Absence makes the heart grow fonder ... (Bronowski 1965: 80). 
It is memory that provides us with the capacity· for vision. Memory makes it 
feasible for us to predict the future. Recurring events that are stored in the memory 
generate expectations (Klix 1987). We are therefore able to advance into the future 
with the impressions that are located in the past. Because of the human being's ability 
to consciously re-organise and re-order the impressions he is able to accomodate the 
context of the future. Consciousness in man therefore involves looking back as well 
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as looking into the future m order for him to function within a context-specific 
situation. 
The issue of context is critical because human beings create context for the new 
text from all the texts that have been previous ly intussuscepted by them. While the 
computer's operation is based on the use of fonnulas. it does not operate fonnulaicly 
in the same way that the human being does for all that it receives is selectively 
captured through the intervention of the human being. The human being who is 
required to programme the computer devises the formula that will provide the input to 
the system. The programme that the human being devis~s is based on a pre-conceived 
understanding of what the programmer requires the computer to do. 
The computer is unable to freely manipulate and randomly re-order and re-pattern 
the formulae to operate within particular contexts, but can only re-play the formulae 
in the order that has been pre-defIDed by the rules ofthe programme_ The computer is 
not able, of its own volitio~ to ident ify or locate a text within a context because it is 
not conscious. The inability to identify context has therefore been recognised as one 
of the main areas that need to be addressed in aspiring to develop a machine that can 
exhibit the kind of intelligence exhibited by humans. 
Douglas Leoat who masterminded the eyc (derived from 'encyclopedia') project 
had this (the notion of context) particular concern in mind when he and his team 
attempted to create a knowledge-based system that contained ~' ... 8 mind-ful of 
corrunonsense knowledge in the form of a single data base containing all the facts 
expressed--or tacitly presupposed--in an encyclopedia!" (Dennett 1988: 291). 
Basica lly what they are doing is keying hundreds of thousands of rules into a 
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knowledge-base in order for it to demonstrate the kind of common-sense that is 
demonstrated by a human being in its interaction with the environment. This project 
was initiated in the early 80's and has still not been completed. John De Oliveira (p.c. 
2000) the Director of Marketing at Cycorp says, 
Many more things need to be done over me next several years to improve eye's ability for 
dealing wim context.. .. 
There is probably more to learn about eye then mere is time to learn it. 
The human being has been able to conserve the memory of his interaction with the 
universe within himself through the psycho-physiological laws, for, ""The common factor 
of memory is the mnemonic factor. It affects all the traditional elements of bilateral 
expressIon, the whole of which constitutes the fabric of living and universal style" 
(JOllSse 1997: 294). The human being constructs his memory from mimismological geste, 
which, through rhythmic re-ordering and re-patteming are played out as formulas. This 
entire process is played out through the characteristic balancing that is specific to the 
bilateral anthropos. 
The computer is unable to operate as a bilaterally miming, rhythmic being that is able 
to randomly manipulate formulas to interact with the environment in the way that the 
anthropos does, as suggested by Jousse. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE UNIVERSE PLA VS IN AND THE ANTHROPOS RE-PLA VS 
When the human being interacts with the cosmos, he receives and intussuscepts the 
vibrations that are inherent in the cosmos that are cosmic energy. It is the cosmic energy 
that is played and re-played within the human being, which he then ex-presses. Therefore 
nil man's ex-pression is formulated from his interaction with the cosmos, and he in turn 
informs the cosmos. This chapter provides details of the human being's interaction with 
the universe, for what the universe plays in, the anthropos re-plays. The discussion is 
presented in two parts, the fIrst is Receive, Re-gister, Replay; and the second is Im-
pression and Ex-pression. 
6.1. Receive, Re-gister, Re-play 
As the human being interacts with the uruverse, be receives stimuli from the 
animate and inanimate beings around him "through the gestes of his whole 
instinctively miming body ( .. . ) The human composite ( . .. ) behaves like a strange, 
sculptural mirror, infinitely fluid and continuously rc::modelled" (Jousse 1997: 91). 
This 'fluid and continuous remodelling' occurs through the process of 're-gistering', 
for man is not a static entity operating in isolation, but a dynamic interactor with the 
environment. The process of ' re-gistering ' is man's ability to re-organise his inner 
world. When a new impression is received, the old impressions accommodate the 
new impression by simultaneously ' re-gistering' themselves, which is an indication of 
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the dynamic nature of human memory. This re-organising, re-ordering and re-
patteming that occurs, is a spontaneous reaction to the impressions that are received 
and manifests in human creativity. 
Without consciously realising it, he [man] becomes a complexity of mimemes OT 
intussuscepted miming gestes, the richness of which increases with each new intussusception. 
The child re-plays the phases of each of the interactions of lhe universe mimically lhrough lhe 
gestes of his whole body, and above all through the uncountable gestes of his hands. What is 
created. physically and unconsciously in the Wliverse is psycho-physiologically and 
consciousl y re-created in and through the child (Jousse 1997: 91-92). 
The human being's ability to re-play these "corporeal and manual mimemes is 
neither scattered nor incoherent" but instead "is accomplished generally in the 
spontaneous, intelligent and logical fonn of a generally three-phase propositional 
geste: 
An Acting One acting on an Acted upon" (Jousse, 1997: 92)(cf. Chapter 4 
Section 4.1). 
The human being becomes a complexity of 'mimemes or intussuscepted miming 
gestes' because of his ability to ' re-gister' the old and the new impressions and store 
the~ and repeat the process when new impressions are received. He is able to re-
order and re-pattern these impressions both consciously and unconsciously. When 
required these gestes can be recognised or recalled with or without prompts. 
Recognition is recall with a number of prompts, and spontaneous recall is the ability 
to get information without external aids or prompts. 
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The key to retrieving any information lies in its organisation (Bruner 1974). All of 
the stored impressions can then be re-played as the need arises. The human being's 
ability to re-play in the absence of the object gives rise to memory. Jousse (1997) says 
that we do not know everything in our interactions, but rather, we know what has 
imprinted itself and this is what will be expressed. This is how re-play operates and 
this is what constitutes memory. We have "a memory bank of gestes" which consists 
of the intussuscepted gestes (Jousse 1997: 130). The particular combinations of the 
intussuscepted gestes that are re-played will be determined by the context of the 
situation in which man interacts. This ability to produce new combinations of stored 
impressions that are context-driven, highlights a cunsiderable difference in the mode 
of operation in a human being and a computer. 
The human being "can retain a web of relationships between arbitrary things. 
Computers typically store things in trees or tables, which rarely match the complexity 
of real life" (Bemers-Lee 1997: 48). This web-like organisation enables the arbitrary 
retrieval of information as well as the ability ..... to take things apart and put them 
back together again in new ways . .. " (HolStadter cited in Gleick 1983). The computer 
does not have the capacity for fluid ity, which is a human characteristic. "Concepts 
must be fluid to do the things humans do" (Hofstadter. cited in Franklin 1995: 351). 
Computer operation is highly structured and dependent on logic. It operates in a linear 
fashion and is therefore not able to randomly make connections with various pieces of 
infonnation. 
Minsky (1982) states that some researchers are experimenting with programs that 
will be able to learn and reason by analogy in the hope that the programs will in the 
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future be able to "recognise which old experiences in memory are most analogous to 
new situations, so that they can 'remember' which methods worked best on similar 
problems in the past." However, the development of a machine that is capable of 
performing this task has not been achieved as yet. 
Machines do not act in plays, and animals do not pretend to be other animal s; they do not 
know how. This is what cannot be mechanized, even in principle, by any procedure that we 
can yet foresee: that we can identify ourselves with the inner environment of others. We know 
what another man fee ls when he fee ls angry, because we have been angry ourselves. We 
know what tenderness feels like. and fear. and curiosity, and cruelty. and fun (Bronowski 
1965: 77). 
The reason why machines are not able to 'act in plays' or pretend to be what they 
are not, is because they do not have the ability to experience emotio~ which stems 
from memory. "Memory is an act of 'Re-play'" (Jousse 1997: 289), which implies 
there is interaction with the environment which the computer does not experience. 
Therefore, the way in which memory operates in the human being and the computer 
is quite different. 
Human memory has the capacity to order memory logically as does a computer in 
a linear network, but human memory goes beyond this capacity and also makes lateral 
and associated connections between strands of memory. Because normal human 
memory works both linearly and laterally at the same time, it is capable of 
innumerable creative configurations, which is the stuff of genius: the rhythmo-
dynamism of the memory constitutes the intelligent creativity of the individual. 
"Memory is a ' conscious re-play of Mirnemes'" (Jousse 1997: 141). Therefore, the 
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human being is able to act in plays and perform stories, because he has the ability to 
're-play the mimemes' and to configure his memory in innumerable ways, which is 
' re-gistering'. It is this ability to ' re-gister' that allows him to show empathy, for his 
interaction takes place fonnulaicly, which implies that it is context-specific. The 
process of 're-gistering' allows the human being to adapt to the situation at hand. 
The ability to make random connections cannot be programmed into a rule-based 
system that operates on logic, which is how the computer operates. However, people 
did think that they could program inteUigence into a machine. It is this notion that has 
led to the various theories about intelligence that have Peen expressed with regard to 
the AI dehate. Some like Sirnon and Newell are fully supportive of the fact that it is 
possible to create an intelligent machine. They "say that a physical symbol system 
can be intelligent, and that any intelligent agent must be implemented via a physical 
symbol system" (Franklin 1995: 102). What Sirnon and Newell are referring to is a 
system that uses physical symbols or symbolic structures that would run on a machine 
and that would eventually start evolving an assortment of symbolic structures. When 
operated on, these symbols and! or symbolic structures would be modified, though the 
operations would be restricted to the rules that have been coded into the machine that 
runs the system In being able to manipulate these symbol structures and producing 
mutations, they claim. that the machine would be exhibiting a measure of 
intelligence. The Anthropos exhibits intelligence, which does not stem purely from 
his manipulation of symbol structures, but rather, in the way he operates within and 
influences his environment. 
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Dreyfus (1972) unlike Sirnon and Newel! thinks that the behaviour of human 
experts is linked to the use of similarity recognition. He thinks that they (the human 
experts) do not employ rules when they are involved in problem solving. 
This directly contradicts the physical symbol hypothesis of Simon and Newel! by denying its 
necessity. It also calls into question its sufficiency. since humans provide the only currently 
known example of general intelligence (FrankHn 1995 : 104). 
Dreyfus supports the notion that intelligence in the human being is manifested by the 
associations that are made in its interactions with the environment. The indiscriminate 
nature of these associations would preclude the use of rule-based systems which 
implies that machines that operate entirely on a rule-based system would not be able 
to function inteUigently. 
The philosophers Horgan and Tienson approach the debate a little differently. 
Many activities requiring intelligence seem to involve the satisfaction of multiple soft 
constraints ( ... ) Adding constraints makes the task harder for computers but easier for 
humans. For computers, every trial solution must be tested against all applicable constraints. 
But to dedde which constraints are app licable means, essentially, to test against all 
constraints. For humans, having more constraints sometimes makes things easier ( ... ) Humans 
deal well with multiple soft constraints but AJ programs do not. This. they claim, suggests 
that human intelligence is different in kind from computer intelligence (Franklin 1995: 114-
11 5). 
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What is implied in the above is that humans are able to deal with restrictions that 
present themselves because they are able to ' re-gister' , which implies re-ordering and 
re-patterning to make relevant associations. 
What the computer lacks is the capacity to make associations that arises from the 
inability to re-gister what is received from the environment and which leads to a lack 
of understanding. This lack of understanding was visible to chess master Garry 
Kasparov when he flfst played Deep Blue in 1996. Even though he did sense a certain 
kind of intelligence in the machine, he still claims that 
If they (computers) "understood" the game, they might act differently, but they don ' t 
understand .. .. I had played a lot of computers but had never experienced anything like this. I 
could feel - I could smell - a new kind of intelligence across the table .... If the computer 
makes the same move that I would make for completely different reasons, has it made an 
"intelligent" move? Is the intelligence of an action dependent on who (or what) takes it? .. . At 
one point, for example, I changed slightly the order of a well-known opening sequence. 
Because it was lUlable to compare this new posit ion meaningfu lly with similar ones in its 
database. it had to start calcu lating away and was tmable to find a good plan. A human would 
have simply wondered, " What's Garry up tor' judged the change to be meaningless and 
moved on (Kasparov 1996: 47). 
It is the computer's inability to make these meaningful comparISOns or 
connections that demonstrates its lack of understanding and compounds the great 
divide between the human being and computer. A human being's understanding 
varies with the complexity of the connections from the given concepts to other 
knowledge. The more connections one recognises, the greater the understanding. The 
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computer is not able to make connections from given concepts to other knowledge to 
increase its understanding. What it is able to do, however, is make comparisons and 
connections with information that is either given or stored, within pre-defmed rules to 
fmd the correct match. And it has the ability to process given information according 
to certain pre-defined rules at incredible speeds. It is for this reason that there is a 
belief among many scientists that if a machine were sentient then the intelligence of 
that machine will far outstrip human intelligence because at present machines are able 
to process specific infonnation at much higher speeds than the average human being. 
While this is true when it comes to the processing speed for computers developed 
to perfonn limited functions (e.g., the chess player. mathematical calculations, 
medical programs, etc.), this is not true for alL For example if one had to consider the 
information processing that occurs in a human being when one places one's hand on a 
hot stove. immediately the heat is felt the hand reacts by pulling away. In that time 
period the hand has sensed the heat. transmitted the message to the brain and the brain 
has responded with the reaction that takes place. 
An explanation for the reaction may lie in Dr Jacques Benveniste's (DigiBio 
1998-1999) observations of «the memory of water" that derive from his studies of 
digital biology. From the perspective of digital biology. water is seen as the "vehicle 
for information". The human lxJdy contains billions of water molecules, which 
contribute to the transmission of infonnation. 
Adding water is not enough to restore activity, it must be ' informed' ( ... ) when molecules 
trigger a biological effect, they are not directly transmitting the signal. The final job is done 
by perimolecular water which relays and possibly amplifies the signal (ibid.). 
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The vibration of the water molecules plays an important role in the transmission of 
information within the human being, because as a molecule vibrates it triggers 
vibrations in other molecules that are in synchrony, which increases the speed at 
which infonnation can be transmitted. 
The computing power of the anthropos is far greater than is currently known, 
unlike the computer, because the information that the anthropos receives at anyone 
time is not limited to just one stimulus, but is receptive to any number of stimuli from 
the environment. 
The speed at which computers are able to process iIifonnation is increasing all the 
time, however. the computer is not required to respond to the multiple inputs that a 
human is required to respond to at anyone time. The computer is very limited in its 
performance outside 0 f what it is designed to do. because it is not adaptive. and 
neither can it generalise, e.g., a chess program will only be able to play chess. it will 
not be able to play any other board game. 
The value of the human memory system lies in its ability to abstract and 
generalise. and then specify. It can draw a particular instance from abstraction and 
generalisation, and when required, can store specific information, which is a sure sign 
of intelligence. "Generalisation allows us to apply the knowledge acquired from one 
experience to a new experience that is similar but not exactly the same" (Cohen 1989: 
219). Therefore speed is not necessarily an indication of intelligence. InteUigence also 
requires a degree of efficiency. Therefore, the development of a computer that is able 
to process information at extremely high speeds is a moot point which is summed up 
really well in the following extract. 
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"What about processor speed? I mean, a ribosome can't be anywhere near as fast as a 
chip." 
Oz smiled approvingly. ><Don ' t be an idiot. Logan," he said. "Speed is irrelevant." 
The student looked shocked, then quickly recovered with a look of smug sceptic ism. 
"Right. So now you' re telling us that speed is irrelevant to computing power'?" 
«For number crunching. speed' s relevant. For real intelligence, it 's complexity that 
matters. Let 's take a dog' s brain, for example. How much would you have to speed it up 
before the dog was as smart as you, Logan'?" (Fabi 1998: 154). 
Human beings cope efficiently with the complexity of the environment because 
they have the ability to apply knowledge from other situations in order [Q combine the 
mimemes in a multitude of ways to meet the needs of the current situation. This 
ability is a reflection of the complexity of the human being's behaviour, which 
reflects the complexity of the environment in which it operates. 
The understanding of this complexity is what poses a challenge to scientists and 
has led to a change in thinking, so that they are now ..... returning to an older notion 
ofintelJigence: that it's embodied and emerges through sensation and interaction with 
the world ... " (Senon 2000). 
Jousse says that this interaction with the world involves ... 
re-play, incessantly and continuously. And we will either have Rememoration - which is 
objective re-play - or Imagination - which is a combination of re-plays adjusted to a common 
form ( .. . ) 
All human problems should be seen and solved as specific cases of general Human 
Mechanics. That is how I see all the questions posed by Memory, which is the indefatigable 
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re~play ofmimemes, and by Rhythm, which is the energetic and facilitating propulsion of the 
re~played mimemes. Man manifests an ephemeral convention of Mimism at play, just as 
humanity is an eternal convention or swn of such individual and indefinitely varied and 
adjusted play (Jousse 1997: 137). 
The capacity of the anthropos to consistently re-play, re-order re-create and re-
pattern manifests in creativity, inspiration and imagination which implies that it is 
able to adapt to the environment. 
it 
The computer does not have the ability to re-order, re-pattern and re-play because 
follows the logic we have given it. That logic may lead to very different consequences than do 
mental processes contaminated by wishes to reach certain outcomes. Indeed, one of the most 
cogent reasons for using computers is to expose holes in our thinking (Weizenbaum 1987: 
65). 
When human beings are faced with a problem they will try different ways to solve 
it. If one way does not work, they will try to figure out why. Then they will turn 
things around and look at it from another perspective in order to try and solve it. This 
is a manifestation of thinking. The computer, which operates on a pre-defined logic, 
does not have the ability to think. which implies that it does not have an independent 
capacity for creativity and adaptability but merely exhibits the programmers capacity 
for creativity and adaptability. The computer does not have the capacity for turning 
things around and looking at it from different perspectives, which manifests its 
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inability to think. This inability to think emphasises the difference between the 
computer and the human being. 
Thinking involves opinion and rational judgement, which means that it is 
influenced by and in turn, influences our reality. In Exploring the Labyrinth of the 
Mind, Gleick (1983) raises questions about the very issue of thinking as well as 
imagination and creativity. 
When you think about yourself, what is being lhought about and what is doing the thinking? 
Can machines be taught the most hwnan ofhwnan tntits - creativity, inspiration, imagination? 
How does a brain of neurons and synapses come to be aware of itself as a mind? (ibid .). 
The kind of action that the computer is capable of is different to the kind of action 
demonstrated by a human being. The computer has to be prompted to perform an 
action, which will stop at a point that is predefined in a program of human origin; 
whereas the human being, is constantly engaged in action through his ioter.J.ctioD 
with the environment, and will stop at a particular action when he cbooses to do so. 
He is creative because he can re-play the intussuscepted gestes in a variety of ways, 
which may not follow any prescribed order, because the human being's re-play IS 
dynamic. 
Jousse says that imagination arises out of memory. For "Memory is the free 
spontaneous, objective re-play of OUI rnimemes. What we ca1l imagination is the 
combination of such re-playings in a mirrored internal configuration which logically 
matches the external source" (Jousse 1997: 665). Imagination is therefore random 
combinations of intussuscepted gestes that correspond with the context of the 
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environment, and man has the capacity to re-play the 're-gistered' impressions that he 
has received from his environment in any number of different combinations, 
6.2. Im-pression and Ex-pression 
This section will look at the differences between man and machine with regard to 
how the memory operates during 'im-pression' and 'ex-pression', 'Im-pression' and 
'ex-pression' are closely linked to the processes of 'receive', 're-gister' and 're-play' 
for 'Im-pression' involves 'receiving' and 're-gistering', and 'ex-pression' involves 
're-gistering' and 're-playing', Before discussing 'im-pression' and 'ex-pression' an 
explanation of Jousse's perceptions of the evolution of human ex-pression needs to be 
discussed. 
The evolution of human ex-presslon stems from the corporeal-manual style, 
which then developed into the laryngo-buccal style. Jousse (1997:173) says that 
"language is, in fact, what expresses the whole being," because language is amplified 
by the Corporeal intussusceptions of the gestes of the cosmos. It is further expanded 
by the gesticulations of the hands (manual) and eventually transposed onto the 
Laryngo-buccal muscles. For the anthropos to ex-press itself holistically, 
incorporating the corporeal-manual and the laryngo-buccal requires a lot of energy. 
Therefore, the anthropos soon transposed his ex-pression in spite of the loss of '"ex-
pressive-ness" to "his oral mechanism" (Jousse 1997: 174). 
When man receives and intussuscepts the gestes of the cosmos, Jousse calls this 
' im-pression'. When what is real is no longer before us, Jousse (1997: 668) says we 
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"have the mimeme embedded in us as a sign." A mime me is a «re-play of the gestes 
which were imposed upon us by an intussuscepted reality"~ Once the impression 
becomes a mimeme it is added to the repertoire of mimemes that the human being 
possesses. The formulation of mimernes is important for ex-pression. for it is through 
the medium of the gestual mime me that man ex-presses himself, to himself as well as 
to others (Jousse 1997). The human being's ex-pression would consist of the playing, 
intelligising, and re-playing of selections of the repertoire of mimemes in order to 
present the best combination of mimemes for intelligent ex-pression. Ex-pression 
takes place, not only "with his mouth, but with his whole body" (Jousse 1997: 268), 
for '~rue human expression ( ... ) is the expression of the entire being" (ibid: 58). The 
human being ex-presses what has been im-pressed through 'play', whjch is 
'gestualised' within us (ibid.). lousse (1997: 129) says that play is the most human 
thing. "Play is the interactional exterior" which imposes itself on us~ is intussuscepted 
by us and is then ex-pressed. The re-play of the geste is fluid because the human 
being constantly receives impressions through the stimulation of the various senses of 
sight, sound, smell, taste and touc~ in his interaction with the universe. 
The computer on the other hand works with inputs and outputs. The inputs and 
outputs enable the computer to demonstrate a capacity for "simulating the mental 
processes of the human being" (Fetzer 1990: 279). Because these inputs are designed 
by human beings they yield outputs that are signs for the human being, however, 
these inputs and outputs do not function as signs for the computer. For the inputs to 
function as signs there has to be an appropriate connection between the infonnation 
stored and the input used. In both the human being and the computer a connection 
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does exist between stored information and inputs, however, the computer does not 
have an understanding of these inputs or the connection because inputs and 
connections arise out of the human being 's interaction with the environment. 
Man, in his interactions with the environment is influenced by various stimuli, 
and accomodates them by the process of ' re-gistering'. 'Re-gistering' plays an 
important role in im-pression and ex-pression for both im-pression and ex-pression 
are context-specific. 
The effect that the various stimuli have on the human being's interactions with the 
environment were evident when Garry Kasparov was astonishingly defeated in the 
1997 chess game against IBM's Deep Blue. 
Whether they (the sponsors) intended to or not, they created a hostile atmosphere that was 
very difficult for me to bear. There was something negative in the air. It was a Deep Blue 
show, and Deep Blue had to win. IBM's total control of the site and the playing conditions 
underscored the vulnerability of the hwnan player. I was the only player in this competition 
influenced by any sort of negative or host ile atmosphere (Kasparov 1997). 
Kasparov's discomfort during the chess game is underscored by the fact that he is 
a thinking human being, because "a thinking human being is an adaptive system" 
(Simon 1969 cited in Rasmussen 1986: 62-63). Because the thinking human being is 
an adaptive system, his behaviour will reflect characteristics of his external 
environment to a large extent, as well as a few characteristics of his inner 
environment. Kasparov's performance, therefore, would have been severely limited 
by the ' hostile environment' that had been created. 
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The machine is not influenced by the various stimuli for it can only receive what 
it has been programmed to receive because it is not an adaptive system, which implies 
that it does not have the capacity for thinking. The difference between the human 
being and the computer is highlighted by Bronowski (1965: 21) when he says, 
.. . man is a self in some of his actions because his procedures for getting experience cannot 
all be fonnalized. The messages from the outside world and his inner world together do not all 
strike him like holes punched in a tape, or magnetic marks made on it. The totaJ of his sense 
impressions, his stored reflections from the past, and the interplay of thought between them 
includes a mode of knowledge that cannot be written out in symbols 3S the new input for a 
machine. 
This "interplay of thought' that Bronowski writes about is the process of 
registering that Jousse discusses. It is this process of 're-gistering' that cannot be 
programmed into a computer for it is based on the ability to make associations which 
the computer is unable to do. Rubin (1995: 31) says, "Associations are certainly one 
of the oldest and most widespread ways of trying to account for the organization of 
memory." Associations are context and culture specific. Culture plays an important 
role in shaping the mind for the human being interacts within a particular cultural 
environment and it is the culture that provides the context. While the basic laws of 
human expression are anthropological, in their ex-pression they take take on an ethnic 
stance. Therefore in trying to understand the mind. one cannot disregard a study of 
culture. The growth of mind is assisted from the outside, for the growth of the 
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individual is dependent on the history of his species, which involves interaction with 
the environment. And the environment provides a context for his interaction. 
Associations derive out of particular uses of words! gestures used within certain 
cultures and contexts. Jaynes (1976) states that with the understanding of associative 
memory and learning, consciousness was established. The reasorung for 
consciousness was that if a human being could adapt his behaviour to different 
experiences, he must be conscious. Jousse 's (1997: 115) explanation of consciousness 
goes a step further, for he says, '~o know is to ' intussuscepC, which leads to 
consciousness." The notion of intussusception is far more intense than that that of 
associative memory and learning for whi le it includes both, it is really a matter of 
making the gestes that flow into the human being from the universe a part of the 
human viscera. Once the geste is a part of the viscera, the human being can co-
ordinate the gestes in order to ex-press them. For Jousse, it is a 'bringing-mto-
consciousness'. which is a process that flows from his interactions, and not a static 
state that exists in the human being. 
Computers are not able to make associations on their own unJess they are 
specifically programmed to do so. But even then, the associations made would be 
limited by keywords or phrases that have already been programmed and are true for a 
programmed context, but cannot be adapted to other contexts. Because the computer 
cannot operate by association it is therefore not conscious. The computer cannot 
identifY when it is having an experience, it cannot adapt its behaviour to 
accommodate the experience and therefore it is not able to learn. What it is able to do 
is produce an output from its memory within a pre-defined context that does not 
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operate in the same way as associative memory operates in the human being. The 
reason for this difference in operation may stem from Theall's (n.d.) explanation, 
which supports Rubin's (1995) perceptions of memory, when he says, 
Recent research into the classical and medieval "arts of memory," inspired by Frances Vates, 
have demonstrated that memory involves the body, a sense of the dramatic and theatrical, 
visual icons and movement, as well as lhe associative power of the oral itself (Theall : 12·13). 
Theall 's explanation supports Pert 's (1997) notion that the body is responsible for 
memory. and ]ousse's when he talks of 'movement' which links up with the Joussean 
notion of the geste. Both Jousse (1997) and Rubin (1995) have highlighted the 
associative memory of 'oral' people. Jousse (1997: 131) says that what is called the 
"'association of ideas' is in fact no more than a 'combination of mimemes· ... 
Mimemes are the "re-play of the gestes which are imposed upon us by an 
intussuscepted reality" (ibid: 668). 
In 'oral' traditions a single formula may bring to mind another formula or a set of 
formulas which aids recall. Sometimes this association can be explicit and sometimes 
not. Repeated pairings provide a local context for the associations in oral traditions 
(Rubin 1995). The more often associations are intussuscepted the greater the im-
pression that is made, for that is memory. 
We memOf"ize in order to comprehend. The more you memorize. the bener you will 
comprehend because everything will be embedded within you for immediate and automatic 
recall . Memory is comprehension from wilhin of the gestes that are repeated and re.played. 
Memorization that endures demands re·memorization repeated tirelessly (Jousse 1997: 665). 
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It is this constant repetition and re-play of associations that enhances the memory. 
This perception supports the constructivist view ofmemory, which has 
... emphasised the role of elaboration, interpretation, and reconstruction based on prior 
experience and stored knowledge. On this view, memory is not a direct copy of the physica l 
infonnation received through the senses. Remembering is not just a process of passively 
receiving impressions. but of creatively constructing a representation. Of course, some 
memories are much closer to an exact copy and some rely to a greater extent on construction, 
but most externally derived memories contain some elements that are internally generated 
(Cohen 1989:30-3 1). 
Memories are a combination of perceived and self-generated material. When we 
remember events or experiences, what we remember of the initial experience is 
embellished with what we have been told about the event! experience as well as what 
the individual has imaginatively reconstructed for himself in order to fill in the 
missing pieces. which alters the event. The process of <re-mem-bering'. which is 
creatively constructing a representation, implies that it is re-played over and over 
again and is therefore fluid and changing. 
The process of <re-rnem-bering' involves the process of 're-gistering' which is the 
re-ordering and re-patterning of internally generated as well as externally generated 
im-pressions. The computer is not capable of re-ordering and re-patteming in this 
way for even though it is capable of re-organising information. this re-organisation is 
based on a pre-defined logic and not arbitrary associations or a specific context. 
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What the human being and computer do share, is the capacity to store huge 
amounts of information although they differ in retrieving the information. Bruner 
(1974: 411) says, 
... the principal problem of human memory is not storage, but retrieval. In spite of the 
biological Wllikelihood of it, we seem to be able to store a huge quantity of infonnation, a 
great sufficiency of impressions. We may infer this from the fact that recognition (that is, 
reca ll with the aid of maximum prompts) is so extraordinarily good in human beings -
particularly in comparison with spontaneous recall where, so to speak, we must get out stored 
information without external aids or prompts. The key to retrieval is organization or, in even 
simpler terms. knowing where to find infonnation and how to get there. 
In human beings as well as computers there is a need for prompts and cues to aid 
recall. However, the types of prompts and cues differ. Once again it comes back to 
the discussion presented earlier (c. f. Pg. 78-79), that in human beings the prompts and 
cues are based on associations which could involve any of the senses, whereas the 
computer requires prompts that have been pre-defined by the logic and input of the 
programme designed in the first instance by man. 
The kind of ex-pression that the computer is capable of is restricted to either the 
visual or aural modes, that is based on a structured programme. If for some reason the 
ex-pression is different to what has been programmed, it indicates a malfunction. 
Jousse (1997: 225) says, "In human expression there must be an awareness of 
meaning." Man exhibits this understanding of meaning in his ability to make 
associations as well as to ex-press himself within particular contexts. The computer is 
not able to exhibit an understanding of meaning for it is unable to make associations 
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or understand context. In his interaction with the computer the human being has to be 
specific about what is required or else he will not get the desired information. 
To a certain extent, the human being is able to know all the information that the 
computer slores for he was responsible for installing it. A human being. however, is 
not capable of knowing all the information stored in another human being. 
It is easy for you and me to exchange knowledge about nature. because we both observe her 
from similar places: you from where you stand and I from where I stand. But can we 
exchange knowledge about the mind of one of us? I observe my mind from the inside, and 
you observe it from the outside; I am consc ious of my thOUghts and feelings in myself, but 
you infer them from my behaviour (Bronowski 1965: 64). 
The kind of re-gistering that occurs in each human being is different because of 
different experiences and associations. Based on his experiences and associations 
each human being therefore ex-presses himself differently to others and this is what 
creates differences in understanding amongst human beings, which underscores the 
complexity of life, which cannot be replicated by a machine. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This study has presented a discussion to support the argument that the computer will 
not be able to possess the general intelligence of the human being. for there are some 
fundamental differences in their functioning. Unless one can fully understand the 
complex operation of the human composite. the pursuit to develop a machine that can 
replicate the functioning of the human being is doomed. 
I have shown that a study of the human brain IS nol enough to provide an 
understanding of memory. intelligence and consciousness. I have also presented an 
argument that illustrates the importance of the psycho-physiological laws of human 
expression, as identified by lousse (1997), for understanding how the human being 
functions as a conscious, intelligent, emotional being. When the ' universe plays in and 
the anthropos re-plays' . the importance of the envirorunent for the development of the 
human capacities for learning, intelligence and consciousness are emphasised. I have 
illustrated this by citing the human being's ability to receive, re-gister and re-play, as well 
as commenting on the processes of im-pression and ex-pression. 
There can be no finality to a study such as this, because the study of artificial 
intelligence is an ongoing one. What a study of this nature can do, is to provide ideas for 
further queries and provide questions for new directions. One of the major problems in 
trying to develop a machine that could replicate the cognitive functioning of the human 
being is that we do not have a proper understanding of how the human being functions 
cognitively. How can one create a machine to replicate human cognitive functioning, 
84 
• 
when one does not understand the cognitive functioning of the human being? Is it at all 
possible that feelings and emotions can be programmed into a computer given that the 
computer does not interact with the universe and therefore does not have a dynamic 
memory? 
In the 1970's and early 1980's, machines were distinguished from human beings 
because they (the machines) did not have a soul, spirit, feeling or emotions. This idea was 
considered a 'romantic notion' at the time, for it looked at the "irrational side of humans 
as an essential quality" (Sack 1997). Spirituality is an important aspect of the human 
being and is a profoundness that operates beyond our perceptions. Spirituality grapples 
with concepts that extend beyond scientific rationale. Is il possiblt:: lht::n thaL the notion of 
AI is doomed because the computer does not have a spirit? 
The etymology of the word 'spirit' is linked to 'breath' for 'spiritus' means 
'breathing ' and 'spirare ' is 'breathe'. Breathing makes an important contribution to the 
human being's interpretation of the environment as well as in anticipating an involvement 
with the environment. We are able to smell and taste the air that we breathe, which 
provides us with cues for our behaviour. The computer is unable to receive these cues and 
therefore cannot adapt its behaviour to accommodate the cues. Therefore. would it be too 
far-fetched to suggest that AI will not be possible because the computer will not be able 
to 'breathe'? 
The human being is a composite of body and spirit, which operates simultaneously. 
It is the body that intussuscepts the gestes, and the spirit that fIxes the gestes in memory. 
Jousse (1997) discusses human mechanics as being necessary to allow memory to be 
durable and precise, for it is the constant re-play of gestes, which includes rhythmic 
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action and breath, that fIxes the memory. Bronowski (1965) also discusses the dual nature 
of man, and draws attention to the idea that the mechanical aspect of man is as important 
as the spiritual nature of man, for they operate in tandem. 
It is the tragedy of our age that we fear the machine in man, though it is as noble as the self; and 
we have grown to doubt whether it will leave us a self. We will not believe tha.t what the machine 
learns and teaches, a knowledge of science, can strengthen our ethic, which now languishes among 
our random loyalties. Yet the search for knowledge in nature generates values as rich as we get by 
reaching for the knowledge of self. When we pursue knowledge for action we learn (among other 
things) a special respect for a man 's work. And when we look. into another man for knowledge of 
our selves. we learn a more intimate respect for him as a man. Our pride in man and nature 
together, in the nature of man, grows by this jlU1ction into a single sense: the sense of human 
digniry. The ethics of science and of self are linked in this value, and more than all our partial 
loyalties it gives a place and a hope to the universal identity of man (Bronowski 1965: 106· 107). 
It is interesting that Bronowski writes about the ' machine in man', for it seems to be 
the point at which developers of AI stopped in their defmition of man. But there is a 'se lf' 
to the human being as weU, that can never be forgotten, for it is the ' self' that affords us 
our humanness. He also writes aoout the ethics of science, for current trends in scientific 
development indicate that ethics have been neglected. Both Bronowski and Jousse 
emphasise the importance of the two aspects of the human being. They also emphasise 
the fact that man is an interactional being and that his knowledge, memory and 
intelligence arise out of his interaction with the environment for the universe plays in and 
the anthropos re-plays. It is the interaction with the environment that fixes the human 
being's experiences and enables him to fonnulate an identity. 
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It is interesting to note that in trying to develop a machine that will outstrip human 
intellectual functioning, developers of AI are using the physical structure of the human 
being, wruch is bilateral, as the model. Why have they not considered developing a 
different physical structure that may be able to function more efficiently? The answer to 
this question may lie in Jousse's perception that human capacity is structured biologically 
and it is a reflection of a balanced cosmos - that we cannot go beyond what we are. We 
are biologically conformed and we can only create in our own image. 
Man, in his quest for science and technology, has gradually allowed his abilities in 
utilising his perceptions to wane and erode as he discovered that machines would 
compensate for his apparent shortcomings. What initially was a quest to execute 
consistency, speed and precision, is now being lauded as the evolutionary future! This 
has culminated in an almost religious belief in the machine, rather than the mind that 
created it, that nurtured it and improved it. Sadly, instead of exploring the potential of the 
mind, he has opted for the consistency of the machine. 
Man in his short~sighted arrogance believes that he is capable of creating a machine 
that can surpass human abilities, when the full potential of human abilities have not been 
realised. The way forward may lie in the eastern philosophical perspective of freeing the 
mind, before attempting to create an artificial mind. In freeing his mind, man's 
perspective will change. 
It will be interesting to see what innovations spring forth in the next twenty years in 
the development of AI, for there have been periods when it flourished and periods of 
disillusion because ofa lack of information. The periods when machines were rejected by 
the modem ecological movements and the Luddites~ though for very different reasons, 
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created set-backs and raised questions about social and mora] accountability and 
responsibility. While the questions about social and moral accountabi lity and 
responsibility pertain to all scientific and technological endeavours. they are sometimes 
ignored. as evinced in cloning experiments, and at other times heeded. 
[f Al became a reality, what would its reference points be? Would its reference points 
lie outside of human culture? Or is it remotely possible that it may be 'spiritual'? [s the 
development of a 'spiritual' machine possible without an understanding of ' human 
spirituality'? 
Current trends indicate that the environment of the future will incorporate machines 
to a greater extent. and the importance of the natural environment wiJl fade. "The 21 SI 
century will be an era of man and information" (Matsumoto & Fujiwara 1991: 120). The 
amount of contact between human beings and computers will increase rapidly. Therefore, 
the computers of the future should be tools that will contribute to the balanced 
development of our society. 
It is hoped that in raising questions about the spiritual nature of man, that the natural 
environment will predominate. If the 20th century was a time that saw the destruction and 
disruption of nature. then the 21 st century should be a time for the restoration of balance 
and harmony between the human being and nature. "Technological developments must 
serve [emphasis added] human purposes and must contribute to the harmony between 
man and narure" (Matsurnoto & Fujiwara 1991: 139). 
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NOTES 
(figures in brackets refer to page numbers) 
1. (I) The terms ' human' and ' man' have been used interchangeably depending on 
which one made for better reading. The term 'man' encompasses 'woman' as 
weU. At times the term' Anthropos' has been used, particularly when there was a 
need to emphasise holistic man. 
2. (1) The term 'emotion' derives from e(x)-motion - 'ex'- out and 'motion' -
movement, which is the moving out of movement that is within or externalising 
the internal rhythmic geste. 
3. (2) 'Memorisation' as used here implies rote-learning, which is not necessarily a 
sign of intelligence. This must be differentiated from Jousse 's understanding of 
the word. which is the '\lnconscious interactional montage which we bring wholly 
into our consciousness before releasing it in the gestual and rhythmic 
mechanisms" (Jousse 1997: 141). Jousse does not differentiate between 
'memorisation' and 'intelligence\ for he feels that because memorisation is 
visceral, it allows for greater flexibility in re-ordering and re-patteming which 
manifests intelligence. 
4. (2) I have used the words ' he' and 'his' to incorporate the representation of both 
genders. To facilitate readability only the masculine pronouns are used. 
5. (17) I am assuming that 'mind' is integral to thought, consciousness and feeling, and 
will therefore not discuss it as a separate entity. 
6. (22) 'Gesture' refers to the mechanical movements of the limbs or body in order 
to express oneself. It has to be differentiated from the term 'geste', which is 
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intrinsic. 'Gestures' represent externally some of the 'gestes ' that man has 
intussuscepted. 'Gestures' are consciously and macroscopically ex-pressed, 
whereas 'gestes ' are continuous, conscious or unconscious, voluntary or 
involuntary, macroscopic or microscopic. 
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